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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

CIVIL PROCEDURE
INTERPRETS

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL THIRD CIRCUIT
PENNSYLVANIA LAW TO ALLOW OFFENSIVE USE OF

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL.

Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co. (3d Cir. 1969)
Plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of an automobile accident
victim, was awarded a default judgment against the estate of the driver
of the car in which plaintiff's decedent was riding. Defendant's policy
covered the owner of the car as well as any other person driving with the
owner's permission. After defendant's refusal to defend the driver's estate
in the default judgment action, plaintiff commenced the present diversity
suit for a declaratory judgment that the driver was operating within the
scope of the owner's permission at the time of the accident,' and was
therefore insured according to the terms of the policy. Two other victims
of the same accident, one injured and one deceased, were joined as plaintiffs, but the owner was not joined. In a jury trial with the defendant
present, the district court entered directed verdicts for the estates of the
two deceased passengers and rendered the declaratory judgment sought
by the surviving plaintiff in accordance with the jury's verdict. 2 On
3
appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded on procedural grounds
1. Edward S. Dutcher, the named insured, was the owner of a passenger car
which he lent to Donald Cionci. While driving the car Cionci collided with a truck
driven by Thomas W. Smith, and as a result Smith, Cionci and John R. Lynch, a
passenger of Cionci, were killed and John Landis Harris, another passenger of Cionci,
was injured.
When Cionci borrowed the car in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, Dutcher gave
him permission to drive to Ardmore and return in one-half hour. Instead of driving
to Ardmore, which is two miles southeast of Bryn Mawr, Cionci drove to Media,
which is ten miles southwest of Bryn Mawr. The accident in question occurred while
returning from Media. The issue of deviation from the scope of Dutcher's permission
was the sole question before the jury and only Dutcher was capable of testifying as
to this issue.
2. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 218
F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Pa. 1963). The trial judge excluded Dutcher's testimony against
the Lynch and Smith estates on the ground that he was incompetent to testify under
Pennsylvania's Dead Man's Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 322 (1958). Dutcher was
allowed, however, to testify against Harris on the issue of deviation. The judge then
directed verdicts for the Lynch and Smith estates and submitted the dispute between
Dutcher and Harris on scope of permission to the jury, which found for Harris.
3. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 365
F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1966), noted in 12 VILL. L. Rtv. 672 (1967). The majority held
that Dutcher was an indispensable party under Rule 19 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
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but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and unanimously reversed that
ruling.4 On remand the Third Circuit ruled on the merits, holding inter
alia,5 that the defendant was not prejudiced by the exclusion of the owner's
testimony as against the plaintiff estates since the defendant had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue of deviation from the scope of the
owner's permission as against the surviving plaintiff, and he was therefore collaterally estopped from raising the issue against the other two
plaintiffs. Judge Kaldoner, however, dissented, despite the protracted
litigation,6 on the premise that the court should have reversed on other
grounds 7 and that under Pennsylvania law8 the use of collateral estoppel
was inappropriate in this case. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co.
v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1969).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel was developed by the courts to
minimize litigation and protect litigants from the danger of harassment.
Collateral estoppel precludes a party from raising an issue of law or fact
which has been determined ii a prior action in which he was a party or
in privity with a party.9 Two major limitations, however, have developed
over the years concerning those parties affected by the doctrine. The first
states that it is a violation of "due process" to bind a party to a prior
PROCMDURz

and, furthermore, declaratory relief should have been denied because both

the Smith estate and Harris had state court actions pending in which all parties
were represented.
4. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968),
noted in 54 ABA J. 396 (1968) ; 56 ILL. B.J. 864 (1968). The Supreme Court held
that Dutcher was not an indispensable party and that the pending state court actions
were not on the same issue.
5. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 411
F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1969). The judgment of the district court was vacated and the cause
remanded with direction to modify the declaratory judgment decree to protect the
interests of Dutcher, who was not joined. Id. at 98-99. Judge Freedman wrote the
opinion of the court, which split 1-1-1, with Judge Ganey concurring and Judge
Kaldoner dissenting.
6. Although the accident in question happened in January of 1958, the two state
actions involving the accident remain untried. The present decision was filed in April
of 1969, indicating that better than eleven years have elapsed and final disposition is
still not at hand.
7. In an action under Pennsylvania's Wrongful Death Act, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1602 (1953), it is settled law that the state's Dead Man's Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 28, § 322 (1958), does not render a witness incompetent because "the action
of wrongful death is not for damages sustained by the decedent but for damages
sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the decedent's death." Dennick v. Scheiwer, 381
Pa. 200, 201, 113 A.2d 318, 319 (1955). For the above reason the dissent stated that:
[t]he District Court erred (1) in ruling that the Pennsylvania Dead Man's
Act, 28 P.S. § 322, rendered [the owner] incompetent as a witness against the . . .
estates [of the two deceased plaintiffs] ; and (2) in its instructions in the [surviving plaintiffs'] trial on the score of deviation.
411 F.2d at 100.
8. The Pennsylvania cases in the field show that whatever might be this Court's
view of the "modern" rule, the Pennsylvania courts still adhere to the doctrine of
mutuality and have made no exceptions applicable to . . . the instant case.
411 F.2d at 104.
9. See Note, 52 CORNVLL L.Q. 724 (1967) ; Note, 1966 DUKP L.J. 283, 285.
For the traditional definition of collateral estoppel, see RESTATUZMNT OF JUDGMVNTS
§ 68 (1942), which states that "where a question of fact essential to the judgment is
actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is
conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action on a different cause of action."
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judgment unless that party has had his day in court. 10 The second limitation is the rule of mutuality, which precludes a party from invoking collateral estoppel unless both he and the other party are bound by the prior
judgment." Mutuality is a policy rule 12 developed by the courts because
it was unfair to allow a non-party to use a prior judgment against a party
since he would not have been bound had that judgment gone the other
way. Although mutuality remains law in a majority of states,'1 3 its often

4
inappropriate results have led most courts to riddle it with exceptions.1
Some courts have chosen to abolish the absolute requirement of mutuality
altogether, 15 but this approach has led to unfair results in a number of
cases. "' It has, therefore, become apparent that neither strict technical
adherence to mutuality nor its complete disregard produces satisfactory
results. Substitutes for mutuality, such as the "full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue" test 17 and the "rule of thumb" approach' 8 have been
tried. Of the two, the former is the more popular, and it involves reviewing the first trial to insure that the party against whom collateral estoppel
is being invoked had an ample opportunity to litigate the disputed issue

10. See Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918). See also

Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 110 (1968).
11. For excellent discussions of the rule of mutuality in collateral estoppel, see
IB J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.412[1]-[9] ; Currie, Civil Procedure: The
Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25 (1965) ; Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality
and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1457 (1968).
12. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,
9 STAN. L. Rgv. 281 (1957).
13. 1B J. Moou, supra note 11, ff 0.411 [1], at 1251. For recent cases see Semmel,
1
supra note 11, at 1461 n.23.
14. Two of the more common exceptions to mutuality are the so-called indemnitorindemnitee and principal-agent anamolies. The rationale for these exceptions is that
one who is liable only because of the acts of another should not be liable where the
other has been legally exonerated. Taylor v. Denton Hatchery, Inc., 251 N.C. 689,
111 S.E.2d 864 (1960) (collateral estoppel was available to employer following
exoneration of driver) ; Hinchey v. Sellers, 7 N.Y.2d 287, 165 N.E.2d 156, 197 N.Y.S.2d
129 (1959) (collateral estoppel available to owner following exoneration of liability
insurer). For an excellent discussion, see generally RESTAEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
§§ 96, 97 & 99 (1942) ; Comment, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion
of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 Gno. WASH. L. RZv. 1010 (1966).
15. E.g., California: Bernhard v. Bank of American Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n,
19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Delaware: Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co.,
36 Del. 124, 172 A. 260 (1934); New York: B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d
141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
16. See Lustik v. Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 131 N.W.2d 741 (1964) (where a
judgment in the first action was asserted as a bar against a counterclaim, notwithstanding the fact that the issue of negligence was never litigated in the first action).
Contra, Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir.
1965) (where plaintiff was not allowed to use a technically adverse judgment against
defendant in the second trial since it was not properly defended because of the small
amount involved in the first action). For an examination of some of the problems
caused by abolishing mutuality, see Semmel, supra note 11, at 1468-71.
17. See Currie, supra note 12, at 309. See also Note, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 724, 727
(1967) ; Note, 44 WASH. L. REv. 449, 452 (1969).
18. The "rule of thumb" test proposes that where mutuality is lacking, collateral
estoppel should be available for use only against a party who was the plaintiff in the
first action. Such an approach would reduce litigation, but not as extensively as the
"full and fair opportunity" test. Professor Currie recognized this when he stated:
"[T]he mutuality rule is deservedly dead, and . . . any reservations about the totality
of its demise should rest on particularized inquiry rather than on rules of thumb.
Currie, supra note 11, at 31.
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at that time. The multiplicity of factors involved in this particularistic
case-by-case approach, however, has deterred many courts from abolishing
mutuality altogether.' 9 The fate of the rule of mutuality, therefore, remains
in a state of flux.
The question of whether collateral estoppel could be invoked under
the factual situation in Provident required that the court evaluate the
applicability of mutuality. Recognizing that the doctrine of mutuality had
yielded with time to many piecemeal exceptions, the court first examined
the case which pioneered the attack on mutuality, Bernhard v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n.20 In that case, Justice Traynor stated
that there was no compelling reason why a non-party could not invoke a
prior judgment since once a person has had his full day in court on an
issue, he should not be allowed to relitigate that issue. 21 Although the
prior judgment in Bernhard was used defensively in the second action,
that opinion also seems to imply that the offensive-defensive distinction
is without merit.2 2 The court in Provident, however, pointed out that
abandoning mutuality altogether, as proposed in Bernhard,23 would lead
to results equally as inappropriate as strict adherence to mutuality, in
certain types of cases. 24 The position taken by the Third Circuit in its
19. See Semmel, supra note 11, at 1468-71.
20. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
21. Id. at 811-12, 12 P.2d at 894. See also Currie, supra note 12, at 283.
22. See Currie, supra note 12, at 289-94. But see Comment, supra note 14.
Professor Currie suggests that there is no reason behind the offensive-defensive
distinction, but that some courts use it to adhere to mutuality while allowing defensive
use to resolve indemnitor and multiple claimant anamolies.
For purposes of discussion, it will be helpful to represent the offensivedefensive distinction graphically. The victor in the first action (A-i) will be enclosed
by a rectangle and the party invoking collateral estoppel in the second action (A-2)
by an oval. In Bernhard v. Bank of American Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d

807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942) :
A-i: heirs v.

[

executor

]

A-2: heirs v.

(

bank

)

This is defensive use of collateral estoppel by a non-party. In B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v.
Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967), the following
diagram applies:
A-l: [_truck-driver

A-2:

(

truck-owner)

] v. jeep owner

v. jeep owner

This is offensive use by a non-party and amounts to the rejection of mutuality. This
graphic aid is suggested in J. ROSENBURG & M. WgIXSTIN, ELEMENTS Olt CIVIL
PROCEDURE 960 (1962).
23. Although this interpretation of Bernhardhas been suggested by some scholars,
a number of California courts view Bernhard's effect very narrowly. See, e.g., Associated Creditors' Agency v. Haley Land Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 610, 615, 49 Cal. Rptr.
1, 5 (1966); Great Western Furniture Co. v. Porter Corp., 238 Cal. App. 2d 502,
508-09, 48 Cal. Rptr. 76, 81 (1965).
24. See, e.g., Semmel, supra note 11, at 1464-71. See generally Moore & Currier,
Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L. Riv. 301 (1961) ; Note,

Res Judicata With Reference to Persons Neither Parties Nor Privies -

fornia Cases, 57 HARV. L. Rxv. 98 (1943).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/7
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own precedent, Bruszewski v. United States, 25 was seen as the better
view. The defendant in that case was allowed to invoke res judicata 26
defensively against the same plaintiff as in the first case, although the
defendant was neither a party nor in privity with a party in the prior
action. The court said that:
no unfairness results here from estoppel which is not mutual [and]
the achievement of substantial justice . . . is the measure of the fair27

ness of the rules of res judicata.

In Provident the court felt that "the facts uniquely combine to remove
any possible element of unfairness or hardship . . .,,28 to the defendant
since he had a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate the issue of deviation
as against the surviving plaintiff. Furthermore, the defendant had the
advantage of having all three claims joined and tried together by the
same judge and jury. As some scholars in the field have noted, however,
the determination of "fairness" requires that the appellate court use its
discretion liberally since the "full and fair" test offers no established guidelines to facilitate the evaluation of the lower court record.2 9 The instant
case amply demonstrates the strong split of opinion that can arise when
30
this approach is utilized to determine the issue of "fairness."
Since this was a diversity action, however, it was necessary to
apply Pennsylvania law.8 ' The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled in
Posternack v. American Cas. Co.82 that the defendant, who was not a
party in the first action, could amend his pleadings to include defensive
use of collateral estoppel against the same plaintiff who had lost the first
judgment. 33 Mr. Justice Egan made the following statement:
25. 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950). This case is

an example of defensive use of collateral estoppel by a non-party:
A-i:

longshoreman v.

A-2: longshoreman v.

[

owner

]

United States

26. The cases used by the Provident court involve res judicata rather than collateral estoppel, but it is settled that the rule of mutuality operates identically under
both doctrines. See Note, 52 CORNXLL L.Q. 724 (1967).
27. 181 F.2d at 421.
28. 411 F.2d at 95.

29. See Semmel, supra note 11, at 1468-69.
30. See note 7 supra.
31. Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127, 138 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 838 (1948). See also C. WRIGIT, FxDA L CoURTS ch. 9 (1963).
32. 421 Pa. 21, 218 A.2d 350 (1966).
33. There is some possibility that this case falls under the common indemnitorindemnitee exception to mutuality. See Judge Kaldoner's dissent in the instant case.
411 F.2d at 105. There is no question, however, that this is an example of defensive
use of collateral estoppel by a non-party.
A-i:

policy holder v.

A-2:

policy holder v. (_insurer #2)

insurer #1
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Recent cases have recognized exceptions to the general rule . . .thus

showing a tendency by this court, at least in limited areas, not to allow
84
the technical formalities of res judicata to stand in the way of justice.

Relying solely on this language in Posternack, the court in Provident
then concluded that there was "no doubt that the Pennsylvania courts
would recognize collateral estoppel in a case such as this." 35 Whether
Posternack is ameanable to such an interpretation or not can be determined only by viewing it in the context of recent Pennsylvania decisions
on mutuality. As is pointed out in the dissent in Provident,8" a long line
of Pennsylvania supreme court cases has firmly established mutuality as
part of Pennsylvania law.37 Although certain limited exceptions to mutuality have been recognized by the Pennsylvania courts, none are applicable
to the instant case. For example, in Brobston v. Darby Borough8 and
in Helmig v. Rockwell Mfg. Co.,39 defensive use of collateral estoppel
was allowed where the same plaintiff brought suit against a defendant
whose liability arose from the alleged wrongful act of another person

who was exonerated in the prior judgment. These two cases represent
one of mutuality's best established exceptions, which provides that an
indemnitee can use a favorable judgment of the indemnitor defensively. 40
The only Pennsylvania case allowing offensive use of collateral estoppel
is Hurtt v. Stirone.41 In that case the plaintiff used a jury verdict that
the defendant was guilty of extortion as being conclusive of that issue.
The court in Hurtt, however, specifically limited the decision to the use
of major criminal convictions in this manner. 42 It appears, therefore, that
Pennsylvania courts would not have allowed collateral estoppel under the
facts of Provident because there was no mutuality of estoppel. 43 This
departure from Pennsylvania law is clearly opposed to the Supreme
Court's mandate in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 44 which stipulated that
34. 421 Pa. at 25, 218 A.2d at 352. The court in Posternack, however, then went
on to state that "[o]n the posture of the present record, it is far from clear whether or
not the doctrine of res judicata should be applied." Id. at 25, 218 A.2d at 352.
35. 411 F.2d at 95.
36. Id. at 104.
37. See, e.g., Evans v. Moffat, 388 Pa. 559, 131 A.2d 141 (1957) ; Woodburn v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 294 Pa. 174, 144 A. 93 (1928).
38. 290 Pa. 331, 138 A. 849 (1927).
39. 389 Pa.21, 131 A.2d 622 (1957).
40. See Semmel, supra note 11, at 1462-63.
41. 416 Pa. 493, 206 A.2d 624 (1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1966). See
note 14 supra.
42. Id. at 499, 206 A.2d at 627.
43. The instant case represents a clear case of offensive use of collateral estoppel
by a non-party:
A-I: [_injured plaintiff_]

& deceased plaintiffs
v. insurer

A-2: (deceased
See

plaintiffs)

note 22 supra.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/7
44. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

v. insurer
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state substantive law is to be applied in diversity actions. It is settled
that the rules of collateral estoppel are substantive45 rather than procedural and, therefore, the Third Circuit's holding in Provident should
have conformed to Pennsylvania law.
The rationale for the Third Circuit's disregard of Pennsylvania law
lends itself to at least two interpretations. The first is that, due to the
protracted litigation,46 the result in Provident would have been unfair had
mutuality been upheld and, therefore, mutuality was disregarded. This
view is supported by Judge Freedman's dissent in Provident's first
appearance before the Third Circuit:
It seems to me that . . . our discretion should be exerted in order
to save for the parties and for the judicial process what has already
been validly determined . . .47
Furthermore, the strength of this interpretation is augmented by the existence of other grounds upon which the court might have reversed. 48 The
second interpretation which can be given to Provident is that the court
wanted to abandon the rule of mutuality and replace it with the "full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue" test. The Third Circuit's strong
criticism of mutuality and its apparent preference for the "modern rule"
add credence to this view. This interpretation is further supported by
the particularistic, case-by-case approach that the court4 9adheres to in
determining the "fairness" of invoking collateral estoppel.
The preceding analysis of the court's rationale in Provident may not
be conclusive of that issue but it does lead to the inference that the "full
and fair" test has replaced the rule of mutuality in the Third Circuit.
The practical consequences of this conclusion become more apparent when
viewed in light of the development of the "full and fair" test since its
inception. As originally conceived the test was meant to effectuate a
limitation on the Bernhard doctrine, which was construed by some scholars
as the complete abandonment of mutuality.50 The actual effect of the test,
however, was the retention of mutuality in cases where the party against
whom collateral estoppel was invoked did not have the initiative in the
first action and, therefore, did not litigate vigorously. 51 The judicial
determination at the appellate level of whether a trial was litigated vigorously or, phrased more appropriately, whether there was a "full and fair"
opportunity to litigate the issue below has caused an inordinate consumption of time in those courts. In order to remedy this problem the courts
45. E.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966), noted in 51 IowA L. Rlv. 747 (1966)
Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mass. 1960).
46. See note 6 supra.
47. 365 F.2d at 823.
48. See note 7 supra.
49. 411 F.2d at 92-95.
50. See Semmel, supra note 11, at 1468. But see note 23 supra.
51. See Currie, supra note 12, at 309.
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have identified a number of factors 5 2 as being pertinent to this question,
but by its very nature the "full and fair" test is not readily adaptable to
standard formulae. Since the purpose of collateral estoppel is to increase
the predictability of judgments and thereby reduce litigation, it would
seem that the discretion-laden "full and fair" test may well frustrate this
doctrine by increasing litigation.5"
John V. Bonneau

CIVIL RIGHTS -

1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT -

A PRIVATELY

RECREATIONAL FACILITY HELD To BE A TITLE II
MODATION

PRECLUDING DENIAL OF ADMISSION

OWNED

PUBLIC ACCOM-

SOLELY ON RACIAL

GROUNDS.

Daniel v. Paul (U.S. 1969)
The defendant, Euell Paul, Jr., and his wife are co-owners of the Lake
Nixon Club. The club property consists of 232 acres located 12 miles west
of Little Rock, Arkansas. The principal facilities of the club include: a
lake for swimming, aluminum paddle boats, two coin operated juke boxes,
a miniature golf course, and a snack bar. These facilities were available
only to members of the club. Membership was acquired through payment
of a 25 cent membership fee per season and evidenced by a membership
card issued upon approval by Mr. & Mrs. Paul. Additional fees were
charged for use of the swimming, boating and miniature golf facilities.
On July 10, 1966, the plaintiffs, black residents of Little Rock, drove
to the Lake Nixon Club seeking admission. It was quickly denied on the
grounds that they were not members. When they inquired about obtaining membership they were told that the quotas for the year had all been
filled.' Consequently, the plaintiffs brought this class action, pursuant to
52. Some of these include size of claim, forum of prior litigation, extent of litiga-

tion, existence of new evidence, adequacy of counsel, and the foreseeability of future
litigation.
53. See Note, 52 CORNMLL L.Q., supra note 9, at 730.
1. Respondent at trial answered in the affirmative a question as to whether blacks
were denied admission because they were blacks. Respondent's reply to an interrogatory of why blacks were refused admission was as follows:
[W]e refused admission to them because white people in our community would
not patronize us if we admitted negroes to the swimming pool. Our business
would be ruined and we have our life savings in it.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/7
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 300 n.2 (1969).
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Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas, to enjoin respondents from denying
them admission.2 The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds
that Lake Nixon Club's operations did not affect commerce and therefore
it was not a "public accommodation" within the purview of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.B On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed with one judge dissenting.4 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorori 5 and reversed, holding that the Lake Nixon Club is a
public accommodation under sections 201 (b) and 201 (c) of the Act and
therefore petitioners may not be denied equal enjoyment of its services
and facilities because of race or color. Daniel v. Paul,395 U.S. 298 (1969).
The 1964 Civil Rights Act was the culmination of bipartisan effort to
effectuate the civil rights policy outlined by President Kennedy in his June
19, 1963 special message to Congress.6 Broadly speaking, this policy is to
protect and provide more effective means for enforcing the civil rights
of persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. 7 In his special
message, the President emphasized to Congress that a most troublesome
source of racial discrimination is the denial of equal accommodation to
public facilities. 8 Congress' reaction to this problem manifests itself in
2. Petitioners' complaints alleged in substance that Lake Nixon was a "public
accommodation" within the meaning of Title II, and that under the provisions of
section 201 (a) they were granted a federal substantive right to be free from discrimination and segregation on the grounds of race with respect to said public accommodation. Section 201 (a) reads:
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation
on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1964).
Petitioners prayed for appropriate injunctive relief as provided for in section
204 of Title II. It states in pertinent part:
Whenever any person has engaged or there are reasonable grounds to believe
that any person is about to engage in any act or practice prohibited by section 203
[which states that no person shall deny or abridge any of the rights secured by
section 201 or 202], a civil action for preventive relief, including an application
for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, may
be instituted by the person aggrieved ....
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 204, 42 U.S.C. 2000a-3 (1964).
3. Kyles v. Paul, 263 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
4. Daniel v. Paul, 395 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1968).
5. Daniel v. Paul, 393 U.S. 975 (1968).
6. For the full text of President Kennedy's speech, see PUBLIC PAPZRS OF TH4
PRSIDW NTS, JOHN F. KtNNEDY, at 485 (1963).
7. The emphasis here is on the words "more effective" because at this time civil
rights legislation did exist. Congress first entered the civil rights arena in 1866. 14
Stat. 27 (1866). This Act was followed by a series of five acts beginning in 1866
and ending in 1875: Slave Kidnapping Act, 14 Stat. 50 (1866); Peonage Abolition
Act, 14 Stat. 546 (1867); Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140; Anti Lynching Act,
17 Stat. 13 (1871) ; The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335. No civil rights
legislation appeared for the next 82 years until the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 42
U.S.C. § 1975 (1964). This Act was followed by the Civil Rights Act of 1960, 42
U.S.C. § 1971 (1964).
8. On February 28, 1963, in his first special message to Congress outlining the
administration's civil rights proposal, President Kennedy underlined the magnitude of
this form of discrimination when he said:
[N]o action is more contrary to the spirit of our democracy and constitution - or
Publishedmore
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Title II of the Act.9 This title is designed to provide aggrieved individuals
with injunctive relief from denial of access to public accommodations.'"
Sections 201 (b) and 201 (c) provide the main thrust of the title since
they establish the criteria against which an establishment or facility is
measured to determine if it acquires "public accommodation" status."
The question of congressional power to enact the public accommodation provisions was reviewed by the Supreme Court in Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States12 and Katzenbach v. McClung.'8 In Heart
of Atlanta Motel, the Court held that congressional power to prohibit
discrimination in public accommodations emerges from the Constitution's
grant of specific and plenary power over interstate commerce. 14 The Court
than the barring of that citizen from restaurants, motels, theatres and other public
accommodations and facilities.
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, JOHN F. KENNEDY, at 228 (1963).
9. See 110 CONG. Rc. 15865-66 (1964) (concise explanation of Title II by
Senator Humphrey). See also 110 CONG. Rtc. 7407 (1964) (remarks of Senator
Magnuson).
10. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 204(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1964).
11. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1964),
provides that:
Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public
accommodation within the meaning of this title if its operations affect commerce,
or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action:
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging
to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building
which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually
occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence;
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain,
or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the
premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises
of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station;
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium
or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and
(4) any establishment (A) (i) which is physically located within the
premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii)
within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered
establishment.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201(C), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (1964), provides that:
The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the meaning of this
title if (1) it is one of the establishments described in paragraph (1) of subsection (b) ; (2) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (2) of
subsection (b), it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers of a substantial
portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products which it sells,
has moved in commerce; (3) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (3) of subsection (b), it customarily presents films, performances, athletic
teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in commerce;
and (4) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (4) of subsection
(b), it is physically located within the premises of, or there is physically located
within its premises, an establishment the operations of which affect commerce
within the meaning of this subsection. For purposes of this section, "commerce"
means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among
the several States, or between the District of Columbia and any State, or between
any foreign country or any territory or possession and any State or the District of
Columbia, or between points in the same State but through any other State or
the District of Columbia or a foreign country.
12. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
13. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
14. 379 U.S. at 258. The Court pointed out that the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act indicates that Congress based its power to enact such legislation on both
the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment and article I, section 8, clause 3 of 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/7
the Constitution (commerce clause), but since the commerce clause power was a

Editors: Recent Developments

WINTER 1970]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

declared that the determinative test of the exercise of this power is simply
whether the activity sought to be regulated is commerce which concerns
more than one state and has a real and substantial relation to national
interests.15 In the McClung case, the Court emphasized the pervasiveness
of the commerce clause grant of power to Congress. It stated that the
commerce clause, coupled with the necessary and proper clause, extended
congressional power to those activities intrastate in nature which so
affected interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress
over it, as to make their regulation necessary for the proper execution of
that grant of power.16
With the affirmation of the constitutionality of the public accommodation provisions, the courts were actively summoned to interpret its broad
language. Federal court application of this statute pivoted around two
principle questions raised by sections 201 (b) and 201 (c) : (1) is the establishment in question one of those covered under 201(b) ?; and (2) if it is,
then do its operations have the necessary nexus with interstate commerce?
As the status of various types of establishments was challenged under
these sections, distinct patterns of response to the above questions emerged.
In the section 201(b) (1)

17

cases the key issue is whether the establish-

ment provides lodging to transient guests. 18 If a factual determination
reveals that it does, then a per se nexus with interstate commerce exists.
The question of whether the particular discriminatory activities being
considered have a disruptive affect on commerce is moot since Congress
has already asserted by the language of 201(c) (1) that it does.' 9
In the eating establishment cases arising under section 201(b) (2),
the first question to be answered is whether the facility is principally
engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises. This is primarily
sufficient basis for upholding its constitutionality, there was no need to consider the
equal protection source of power.
15. Id. at 255.
16. 379 U.S. at 301-02.
17. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1964). For complete text of section 201 (b) see note 11 supra.
18. The term "transient guests" has been held to include: (1) travelers, (2)
mere itinerants and overnight guests, (3) any guests if the establishment does in
fact serve the public. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253
(1964) ; Stout v. Y.M.C.A., 404 F.2d 687, 689 (5th Cir. 1968) ; 110 CoNG. Rtc. 7405
(1964) (remarks of Senator Magnuson). See, e.g., United States v. Beach Associates,
Inc., 286 F. Supp. 801 (D. Md. 1968) ; United States v. Clarksdale, King & Anderson
Co., 288 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Miss. 1965).
19. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201 (c) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d(c) (1964). For the
complete text of section 201 (c), see note 11 supra. In the McClung case the Court
emphasized the fact that an act of Congress based on the commerce power does not
have to provide for independent determination regarding the affect on commerce of
the particular activity proscribed. Congress may say what activities affect commerce
and the only question for the courts to decide is whether the particular activity regulated is within the reach of federal power. The fact that Congress has said a particular
activity burdens interstate commerce does not preclude further examination by the
courts, but when they find, in the light of the facts and testimony before them, that
Congress has a rational basis for finding the chosen regulatory scheme necessary to
the protection of commerce, the court's investigation is at an end. 379 U.S. at 297-98.
For a discussion of the effects on interstate commerce of discrimination in the lodging
of transient guests see U.S. CODA CONGRMSSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVS Nnws, 88th
Published
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a factual determination and has presented little problem to the courts.20
Establishments which have been found to fall within this category in24
23
22
clude: restaurants, 21 drive-in-restaurants, lunch counters, coffee shops,
25
26
cafes and snack bars. Once this determination is made, the next question is whether the necessary nexus with interstate commerce exists. On
this point, Congress has provided two controlling tests: (1) whether
the establishment offers to serve or does in fact serve interstate travelers;
or (2) whether a substantial portion of the food served moves in inter27
state commerce.
In applying the first test - whether the establishment offers to serve
interstate travelers - the courts have looked primarily to two signposts
in making their determination: the sources and scope of advertising em28
ployed by the establishment and its propinquity to interstate highways.
The rationale behind the courts' reliance on the above two signposts is that
notice and/or ease of accessibility tend to make it more probable than not
that at least some interstate travelers will stop for services.2 9 Advertising
media which have been determinative on this point have included: regional
radio and television,3 0 daily and monthly newspapers, 8 ' magazines,3 2 bill20. In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), the
Fourth Circuit indicated that this question becomes somewhat problematical in drivein-restaurant cases but held that the purpose of this determination has no bearing on
the percentage of food consumed on the premises but is intended to exclude from coverage of the Act those places where food services are incidental to some other business.
21. Restaurants are specifically mentioned in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2) (1964).
See, e.g., Blow v. North Carolina, 379 U.S. 684 (1965) ; Wooten v. Moore, 400 F.2d
239 (4th Cir. 1968) ; United States v. Beach Associates, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 801 (D. Md.
1968) ; Codogan v. Fox, 266 F. Supp. 866 (M.D. Fla. 1967) ; United States v. Jack
Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1967) ; Willis v. Pickrick Restaurant,
231 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
22. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967)
Gregory v. Meyers, 376 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1967).
23. Lunch counters are specifically mentioned in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2) (1964).
See, e.g., Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964); Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc.,
261 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1966).
24. Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968) ; United States v. Clarksdale, King & Anderson Co., 288 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Miss. 1965).
25. United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1968).
26. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) ; Fazzio Real Estate Co. v. Adams, 396
F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Codogan v. Fox, 266 F. Supp. 866 (M.D. Fla. 1967).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (1964). See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969);
Blow v. North Carolina, 379 U.S. 684 (1965) ; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964) ; Wooten v. Moore, 400 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1968) ; United States v. Richberg,
398 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 377 F.2d 433
(4th Cir. 1967) ; Gregory v. Meyers, 376 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Codogan v. Fox,
266 F. Supp. 866 (M.D. Fla. 1967) ; United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club,
265 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1967) ; Willis v. Pickrick Restaurant, 231 F. Supp. 396
(N.D. Ga. 1964).
28. See the cases cited in note 27 supra. These two signposts have been employed
by the courts in 201 (a) cases also.
29. See the cases cited in note 27 supra. Mr. Justice Black in his dissenting
opinion in the present case indicates that the absence of these factors make it more
probable than not that interstate travelers did not frequent Lake Nixon.
30. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) ; Wooten v. Moore, 400 F.2d 239 (4th
Cir. 1968); Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968).
31. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) ; Wooten v. Moore, 400 F.2d 239 (4th
Cir. 1968) ; United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.
La. 1967).
32. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/7
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boards along interstate highways,83 and brochures circulated to hotel
guests.8 4 A covered establishment's propinquity to an interstate highway
has varied in each case. In those cases where the courts considered this
signpost significant, the facility was located somewhere within the range
of 60 feet to 5 miles. 35 The "substantial portion" test, as an alternative to
the service of interstate travelers test, has by application manifest its
sweeping characteristics. 6 It appears that the most that can be said on
this point is that the amount of food which must move in interstate com87
merce is a relative one.
Under section 201 (b) (3), motion picture houses, theatres, concert
halls, sports arenas, and stadiums, which are specifically referred to therein, have created little difficulty. However, it has been otherwise with
respect to the application of the "place of exhibition or entertainment"
41
40
clause. 8 Amusement parks,39 nightclubs or cabarets, and golf courses
have all been held to fall within this category. The test for finding a nexus
with interstate commerce under this section is whether the "sources of
entertainment . . . move in commerce.

' 42

The courts have construed

"sources of entertainment" to include: movie films, 48 amusement park
equipment, 4 vocal groups, 45 and tournament teams. 6 Two fine distinctions have been made with respect to the application of this test. First,
the determinative factor is not the source of entertainment presented at the
time the cause of action arose, but the "customary" source of entertainment
employed. 4 7 Secondly, the word move found in the phrase "move in com33. Blow v. North Carolina, 379 U.S. 684 (1965) ; United States v. Jack Sabin's
Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1967).
34. United States v. Beach Associates, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 801 (D. Md. 1968).
35. In Blow v. North Carolina, 379 U.S. 684 (1965), the restaurant was sixty
feet from an interstate highway. In Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964),
the restaurant was eleven blocks away. In Gregory v. Meyers, 376 F.2d 509 (5th
Cir. 1967), the distance was three blocks. In Codogan v. Fox, 266 F. Supp. 866 (M.D.
Fla. 1967), the distance was three-fourths of a mile. In Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc.,
261 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1966), the golf course was five miles from two interstate highways.
36. In Gregory v. Meyers, 376 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1967), the court found that
$5000 worth of coffee and tea that had moved in interstate commerce plus the fact
that two-thirds of the $70,856 total sales of beef products were purchased from a meat
packer who subsequently purchased 20-30% of his cattle out of state, constituted a
substantial portion of the establishment's total food sales. See also S. ReP. No. 872,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 171-73, 212, 229 (1964). Compare the cases cited in note 27 supra.
37. Gregory v. Meyers, 376 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 1967).
38. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3) (1964).
39. Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968).
40. Robertson v. Johnston, 249 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. La. 1966).
41. Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1966).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (3) (1964).
43. United States v. Sampson, 256 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Miss. 1966) ; United States
v. Gulf State Theatres, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 549 (N.D. Miss. 1966); Twitty v. Vogue
Theatre Corp., 242 F. Supp. 281 (M.D. Fla. 1965).
44. Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968).
45. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) ; Robertson v. Johnston, 249 F. Supp. 618
(E.D. La. 1966).
46. Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1966).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (3) (1964). In Laurel Links the district court held
that a golf team from Washington, D.C., playing on the course on a regularly scheduled
annual basis was a "customary" source of entertainment. Id. at 477.
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merce" is not to be strictly construed as meaning only the present tense of
the verb. The past, past perfect, and present perfect tenses of moved, had
48
moved and have or has moved are also to be controlling in its construction.
The final category of establishments considered under the public accommodation provisions have been termed "dual establishments. '49 A more
comprehensive understanding of this expression may be derived from a
close examination of 201 (b) and 201 (c) language. These subsections have
the pervasive feature of bringing the entire establishment within the scope
of Title II if it (1) has located within its premises or it is located within
the premises of an establishment covered by either section 201(b) or
section 201 (c) ; and (2) it holds itself out as serving patrons of the covered
establishment.50 An illustration of the application of this provision is a
department store that has within its premises a lunchroom which has
acquired public accommodation status under 201(b) (2) and which serves
the patrons of that store. Under this hypothetical, the facilities of both the
lunchroom and the department store must be made available on a nondiscriminatory basis. 51
When an establishment is being challenged under Title II, a frequent
defense raised is that it is a "private club" under section 201 (e) and
therefore not subject to federal sanction. 52 This section exempts from the
Act a private club not in fact open to the public. a In deciding whether
a purported private club actually acquires this status, the courts look to
two factors: the purposes for which the club was organized, as revealed by
its by-laws, rules and regulations and its structure and operations."4 These
48. Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 351 (5th Cir. 1968)
(emphasis added).
49. Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968).

50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (4) (1964).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(4) (1964); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c)(4)

(1964).

In

Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474, 476 (1966), the district court held that
the lunch counter located on the golf course, which it found to serve interstate
travelers, brought the entire golf course under Title II. In Fazzio Real Estate Co. v.
Adams, 396 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1968), an entire bowling alley was brought under
Title II when the Fifth Circuit held that the refreshment counter sales, excluding
beer, were 8-11% of total bowling alley sales and that a substantial portion of the
refreshment counter food moved in commerce. Also, in United States v. Beach
Associates, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 801 (D. Md. 1968), the district court held that the
carry-out-shop, which served interstate travelers food, a substantial portion of which

had moved in commerce, was located within the larger Beach Club premises and
served its patrons, therefore bringing all the Beach Club facilities under the Act.
Contra, Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968), where the Fourth Circuit
held that Y.M.C.A. facilities consisting of a community building and an athletic
building joined together by a breezeway were separate and distinct operations, were
not an integral unit therefore not necessary to invoke 201 (b) (4).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1964), states in relevant part that:
The provisions of this title shall not apply to a private club or other establishment
not in fact open to the public. ...
53. 110 CONG. Ric. 13697 (1964) (remarks of Senator Long). See, e.g., Stout
v. Y.M.C.A., 404 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1968); Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A., 397 F.2d 96 (4th
Cir. 1968) ; United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.
La. 1967).
54. See Stout v. Y.M.C.A., 404 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Richberg, 398 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir.
1968); United States v. Beach Associates, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 801 (D. Md. 1968);
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/7
United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1967) ; United
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two factors are then juxtaposed and a conclusion drawn as to the club's true
nature. Some of the criteria utilized by the courts in this functional analysis
include: the open ended character of its membership,5 5 size, 50 genuineness
of selectivity in membership, 57 sources of financial assistance,58 utilization
of club machinery,59 and the methods of membership recruitment.60
Prior to the Paul case, the scope of 201 (b) and 201(c) had been
primarily determined by the lower federal courts.5 ' But the facts in those
cases did not require an extension of the statutory language as would
be necessary to find Lake Nixon a public accommodation. The overriding
national policy against discrimination in public accommodations and the
necessity of a liberal construction of the Title II provisions to the facts in
the Paul case set the stage for Supreme Court action.
The Court's finding that Lake Nixon is a public accommodation is
grounded on two major arguments. The first argument is that the Lake
Nixon snack bar is an establishment principally engaged in selling food
for consumption on the premises under 201(b) (2) and its operations
affect commerce as enumerated in 201(c) (2).62 The Court reasoned that
because the sources of Paul's advertising included a monthly magazine
distributed to Little Rock hotel guests, the Little Rock Air Force Base
monthly newspaper, and spot commercials on two local radio stations, they
covered a broad-based market which had to include some interstate
travelers under 201(c) (2).63 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that since
States v. Clarksdale, King & Anderson Co., 288 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Miss. 1965).
In Richberg, the Fifth Circuit, after reviewing the stated purposes of the club, said:
The Dixie Diner Club, is devoted, in the words of its by-laws, to "The creation
of an atmosphere conducive to the development of connoisseurs of discriminating
taste and epicurean pleasures" .

. .

. [But] the record conclusively shows, that

the club has maintained the same food, menu, prices and serving personnel as
formerly characterized operations of Richberg's Cafe, and as still characterize
the cafe's operations today.
398 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1968).
55. See Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A., 397 F.2d 96, 101-02 (4th Cir. 1968).
56. Id.
57. See Stout v. Y.M.C.A., 404 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1968); Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A.,
397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968) ; United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp.
90 (E.D. La. 1967) ; United States v. Clarksdale, King & Anderson Co., 288 F. Supp.
792 (N.D. Miss. 1965).
58. Stout v. Y.M.C.A., 404 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1968); Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A.,
397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968).
59. See United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Nesmith v.
Y.M.C.A., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968) ; United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club,
265 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1967) ; United States v. Clarksdale, King & Anderson Co.,
288 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Miss. 1965).
60. Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968).
61. The only cases decided by the Supreme Court which reviewed the language
of these sections are, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). In both of these cases the Court
was primarily confronting the question of the constitutionality of the Act. The other
cases considered by the Court, relevant to the Act, concerned convictions under state
trespass laws for civil rights activities, and the interpretation of sections 201 (b) and
201 (c) were incidental to those issues. See United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563
(1968); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966); Blow v. United States, 379 U.S.
685 (1965) ; Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964). Contra, Adderly v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39 (1966).
62. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 304-05 (1969).
63. Id. at 304.
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the Club actually served 100,000 patrons per season, it was unrealistic to
64
assume that none of them were interstate travelers.
To shore up their finding that the snack bar had the necessary nexus
with interstate commerce, the Court decided that since the district court
had taken judicial notice of the fact that the principal ingredients of the
hamburger and hotdog rolls were produced out-of-state and that certain
of the ingredients composing the soft drinks were "probably" obtained
from out-of-state sources, there could be "no serious doubt" that a "substantial portion" of the food served moved in interstate commerce.6 5 Based
on these findings, the Court concluded that since the snack bar is a covered
establishment within the premises of the larger Lake Nixon facility and it
serves those patrons, then subsections 201 (b) (4) and 201(c) (4) are
determinative and bring the entire facility within the compass of Title 11.66
The second argument propounded by the Court is centered on subsections 201(b) (3) and 201(c) (3). Here, the majority asserted that
Lake Nixon falls within the definition of a place of entertainment as
provided for by 201(b) (3) since a reasonable construction of that term
is not confined to establishments in which patrons are entertained as
spectators, but also includes those involving direct participation.6 7 The
201(c) (3) requirement of a nexus with commerce was satisfied by the
fact that the Club's mechanical "sources of entertainment," which included
two juke boxes with the accompanying records, 15 paddle boats and a few
surf boards, were manufactured outside of Arkansas and therefore moved
68
in commerce.
The Court also made passing mention of the private club defense
raised by the defendant. It asserted that the lower courts were correct in
their determination that Lake Nixon was not a private club because the
membership device was no more than a "subterfuge" to avoid coverage of
the Act and the Club did not have the self-government and member-ownership attributes traditionally associated with private clubs.6 9 This question
is ultimately a factual one and the burden of proof rests with the party
70
claiming the exemption.
The primary question raised by the Paul decision is the Court's
extension of Congress' regulatory power over interstate commerce to the
Lake Nixon facility. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Mr. Justice Clark,
speaking for the entire Court, outlined the extent of this power:
[T]he power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local
64. Id.
65. Id. at 305.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 306.
68. Id. at 308.
69. Id. at 301-02.
70. United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Kyles v. Paul,
263 F. Supp. 412, 416 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/7
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activities in both the States of origin and destination, which
7 1 might
have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce.
Here the Court underlines the basic scope of Congress' regulatory power
over interstate commerce and supports its legislative activity in the area
of racial discrimination. Both houses of Congress carefully considered
the harmful affects of racial discrimination upon interstate commerce and
subsequently, through section 201 (c), defined the parameters within which
72
it wished to extend its power.
Congress has declared in 201(c) (2) that when a 201 (b) (2) establishment serves or offers to serve interstate travelers, or when a substantial portion of the food it serves has moved in commerce, then its
operations affect interstate commerce and it is subject to regulation. The
Court, in deciding that the Lake Nixon Club is a public accommodation,
declares that Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce shall extend
to this facility because the snack bar affects commerce by offering to serve
and in fact serving interstate travelers. But the Court's conclusions of
fact on this point seem wanting. The district court found that the Pauls
used the facilities of radio station KALO to advertise the Club's weekly
dances, but the record also reveals that these ads were addressed to members only. 73 The fact of advertising in the "Little Rock Today" monthly
magazine and the "Little Rock Air Force Base" monthly newspaper seems
equally inconclusive since only one advertisement had been placed in each
publication. 74 These factors coupled with the fact that Lake Nixon is
located 12 miles west of the city and only accessible by country roads
seems to weaken the Court's conclusion on this point.
The majority's employment of the 201(c) (2) "substantial portion"
test suffers from the same infirmities. The record of the trial court is
silent on the question of where or how local suppliers obtained the soft
drinks, but it did indicate that they were bottled locally. 7" The Court's
treatment of the district court's assertion that "[C]ertain ingredients were
probably obtained by the bottlers from out-of-state sources"7 6 is to accept
the reasonably possible as being conclusive. The district court's finding that
the meat may or may not have come from out-of-state and that the buns
were baked and packaged locally, leaves the only substantially certain source
71. 379 U.S. at 258.

72. A careful analysis of section 201 (c) will reveal that Congress has merged
two distinct commerce clause doctrines: the "flow" and the "affectation" doctrines.
The flow doctrine extends federal commerce power to all those "things" actually
moving in commerce and the transactions, contracts, and other activities incidental
to them. See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871) ; Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The affectation doctrine extends federal commerce power to those activities adversely and injuriously affecting interstate commerce. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) ; N.L.R.B. v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) ; Houston, E.I.W.T.R. Co. v. United States,
234 U.S. 342 (1914).
73. Daniel v. Paul, 395 F.2d 118, 122-23 n.4 (8th Cir. 1968).
74. Kyles v. Paul, 263 F. Supp. 412, 418 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
75. Id. at 418.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
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of food moving in commerce to be the ingredients used in the rolls. They
were judicially noticed by the district court as coming from out-of-state. 77
The application of the 201(c) (3) test for determining whether congressional regulatory power shall extend to a 201(b) (3) establishment
seems also to be somewhat distorted. The only "sources of entertainment"
that could be considered as having moved in commerce are the two juke
boxes and records which were manufactured outside Arkansas and the 15
paddle boats which were leased from an Oklahoma firm. 78 The band that
performed at the weekly dances were found by the district court to be a
purely local amateur group. The Court of Appeals also pointed out that
thousands of paddle boats of the type used at Lake Nixon were manufactured locally, which leaves open the possibility that they were also purchased locally by the Oklahoma firm and hence never physically left the
79
state of Arkansas.
Perhaps the Court's finding that the Lake Nixon facility is a public
accommodation under the provisions of Title II is more readily understood when it is viewed as the result of something more than a statutory
explication. What seems to be at the foundation of this decision is a
recognition of a congressional policy to enforce the civil rights of American
citizens through a regulatory scheme that is based on congressional power
to regulate interstate commerce.8 0 The Court, recognizing that the commerce clause grant of power is sufficient to support the full realization of
this policy, ultimately concludes that this realization will be best accomplished by a broad interpretation of this congressional mandate. 8 ' The
immediate impact of this broad interpretation seems to be twofold. First,
77. Id.
78. Daniel v. Paul, 395 F.2d 118, 125 (8th Cir. 1968). The Eighth Circuit concluded that:
There is not one shred of evidence that Lake Nixon customarily presented any
activity or source of entertainment that moved in interstate commerce.

79. Id.
80. Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion agrees with the majority's
application of Title II to the Lake Nixon facility. However, he also finds that the
privileges and immunities and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
are another source of prohibition against racial discrimination in public accommodations. 395 U.S. 308-09 (1969). In Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), Mr. Justice
Douglas (concurring) argued that the denial of equal rights to public accommodations is a "relic of slavery" that is prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at
242-60. For a thorough analysis of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of "badges
and incidents of slavery," see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) ;
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883). See also 14 ViLL. L. Rxv. 116 (1968).
Mr, Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in Paul argues that if Congress had
chosen to invoke the broad power of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis
for enacting Title II, he could agree with the majority holding. However, since it
based the Act on its commerce clause power, its protection against racial discrimination is limited to the extent of that power. The Lake Nixon facility is beyond Congressional reach and to hold otherwise:
[WIould be stretching the Commerce Clause so as to give the Federal Government complete control over every little remote country place of recreation in
every nook and cranny of every precinct and county in every one of the 50 states.
395 U.S. at 309, 312.
81. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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it emphasizes that congressional regulation of racial discrimination in public
accommodations will extend to facilities whose operations have only a
very minimal nexus with interstate commerce. Secondly, it emphasizes
that even though Congress expressly provided for a private club exemption
from the Title II provision, there is an overwhelming burden of proof on
any party intending to claim it.
Howard D. Venzie, Jr.
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Lemon v. Kurtzman (E.D. Pa. 1969)
Individual plaintiffs as taxpayers, nonprofit corporate plaintiffs, and
unincorporated association plaintiffs jointly brought suit against Pennsylvania Secretary of Education Kurtzman and State Treasurer Sloan, as
well as several nonpublic schools within the Commonwealth, to enjoin the
alleged unconstitutional expenditure of state funds under the Nonpublic
Elementary and Secondary Education Act.' The specific allegations of unconstitutionality were that the Act provided for the establishment of religion, prohibited the free exercise of religion, and constituted a denial of
equal protection of the laws. The defendants answered the allegations by
moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing and failure to state
2
a claim upon which relief could be granted. A three-judge district court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure of all plaintiffs to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, holding that since
the purpose and primary effect of the Act neither advances nor inhibits
religion, the Act does not infringe upon either the establishment or free1. PA. STAr. tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (Supp. 1969). The Act provides for the creation
of a fund to finance the purchase of secular educational services from nonpublic schools
which fulfill the compulsory school attendance requirements under Pennsylvania law
including those schools administered by religious sects. The Superintendent of Public
Instruction is to purchase these services of the nonpublic schools at the actual cost of
teacher salaries, textbooks and instructional materials only in the courses of mathematics, modern foreign languages, physical science, and physical education. Funds for
the operation and administration of the Act are to be drawn exclusively from the
taxes collected from State horse and harness racing.
2. The complaint alleged the unconstitutionality of a statute of state-wide
application, and sought injunctive relief against a state official, therefore the convening of a three-judge panel to hear the case was appropriate. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84
(1964).by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
Published
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exercise clauses of the first amendment. 3 Lemon v. Kurtzman,
F.
Supp.
(E.D. Pa. 1969).
Prior to 1968, Everson v. Board of Education4 was the principal
Supreme Court case concerning aid to nonpublic schools. In Everson the
Court upheld state reimbursement of bus fares for school children regardless of the school they attended. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority, concluded that the New Jersey legislation 5 did "no more than
provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless
of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools"'6
and thereby was only extending its general public benefits to all its citizens.
Thus, read narrowly, the Everson opinion supported a restricted view of
7
aid to parochial and private schools.
For twenty-one years after Everson the Supreme Court did not clarify
the question of whether or not the rationale of Everson would be confined
to non-educational aid, such as transportation and fire protection, or
whether the idea of a public benefit concept could be expanded to include a
more direct form of aid for educational purposes as some authorities
contended. 8
One of the reasons for the absence of Supreme Court guidance regarding public aid to nonpublic schools was caused by the inability of a
taxpayer to acquire standing to challenge the constitutionality of such
appropriations.9 This inability was diminished somewhat in Flast v.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1, provides that:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof .
This ban also represents a bar on State action since it has been judicially incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
4. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See generally 60 HARV. L. Rv. 793 (1947) ; 45 MicH. L.
Rev. 1001 (1947) ; 96 U. PA. L. Rlv. 230 (1947).
5. N.J. Rzv. STAT. § 18:14-8 (1941), reads in pertinent part:
Whenever in any district there are children living remote from any schoolhouse,
the board of education of the district may make rules and contracts for the
transportation of such children to and from school, including the transportation
of school children to and from school other than a public school.
6. 330 U.S. at 18.
7. See, e.g., L. P91IVIYgR, CHURCH STATS AND Fa"gDom 149 (1967), where the
author states :
[A]II the justices agreed that the First Amendment was to be given a broad interpretation, and that its intent was not merely to prohibit the establishment of
a state church but to preclude any government aid to religious groups or dogmas.
The language relied on in Everson to support this view is that neither a state nor
the federal government can "pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another." 330 U.S. at 15.
8. See, e.g., Drinan, The Constitutionality of Public Aid to ParochialSchools,
in THP WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 71 (D. Oaks ed. 1963), where the
author concludes:
Public welfare benefits surely include secular education, and by the rulings in.
[Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930)] and Everson
the benefits extended by the state to all citizens may not be denied to anyone
because of his religious faith or lack of it.
9. In this context, the doctrine of standing to sue in a federal court on a constitutional issue is concerned with whether there is a justifiable controversy between
the complaining taxpayer and the governmental unit being sued which would give the
court subject matter jurisdiction over the parties. In Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923), the court ruled that a federal taxpayer is without standing to
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Cohen' ° where the Court allowed the standing of a federal taxpayer to
challenge a federal spending program if he could establish the required nexuses between himself and the governmental expenditures. First, the taxpayer had to establish a logical link between his status as a taxpayer and
the type of legislative enactment attacked, i.e., the taxpayer had to show
that he "contributed" to the funds being distributed. Second, he had to
establish a nexus between his taxpayer status and the precise nature of
the constitutional infringement alleged, i.e., that the expenditure was in
contravention of a specific constitutional limitation." In Flast, both
elements were satisfied since it was alleged that the taxing and spending
powers of the federal government were being used in excess of the specific
constitutional limitations imposed upon their exercise by the establish2
ment clause.'
With the standing problem alleviated to an extent, the Court was
able to turn its attention to the substantive issues presented in government aid to nonpublic schools. In Board of Education v. Allen,' 3 the
Supreme Court held that a New York statute' 4 providing for a loan of
secular textbooks to parochial school students did not violate the establishment clause in that the law had "a secular legislative purpose and primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.' u 5 The secular purpose
and primary effect test was first clarified by the Court in a decision which
struck down the practice of bible reading in public schools as violative
of the establishment clause of the first amendment. 16 In refusing to rely
principally on Everson, the Allen Court signified its intention to allow a
more direct form of aid to nonpublic schools without the use of the public
welfare rationale used in Everson.'7 It cannot be doubted that Allen goes
further than Everson in that textbooks are considered as directly involved
challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute which authorized the spending
of federal funds.
10. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The plaintiffs in Flast sought to enjoin the alleged
unconstitutional expenditure of federal funds under the Federal Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 241a, 821 et seq. (Supp. II, 1967).
See generally The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. Rxv. 63, 224 (1968);
48 NAB. L. Rgv. 536 (1969) ; 36 U. CHI. L. Rrv. 364 (1969).
11. 392 U.S. at 102. The Flast Court noted that:
the emphasis in standing problems is on whether the party invoking the federal
court jurisdiction has "a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" . ..
and whether the dispute touches upon "the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests......
, -_ (E.D. Pa. 1969).
Id. at 101 quoted in Lemon v. Kurtzman, __ F. Supp.
12. Lemon v. Kurtzman, ___F. Supp. _,
. (E.D. Pa. 1969).

13. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).

See generally The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82

HARV. L. Rev. 63, 172 (1968); 35 BROOKLYN L. Rlv. 286 (1969); 37 FORDHAm L.

Rev. 123 (1968).
14. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
15. 392 U.S. at 243.
16. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). See generally
RICA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC PRAYER (1964). Although the Schempp
decision is the principle source of the purpose and primary effect test used in Allen,
its foundation stems from the Sunday Law Cases. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961).
17. However, it should be noted that the Court stated in Allen that the purpose
and primary effect standard would sustain the aid allowed in Everson. Board of
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
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in the educational process while bussing is only a safety measure incidently
affecting education.
The extent to which the purpose and primary effect standard could
be used to uphold public spending in support of nonpublic education remained a disputed question after Allen and therefore the Lemon Court
concentrated its attention on the issue of whether or not the Pennsylvania
Act came within the permissible limitations of the secular purpose and
primary effect rationale.
Before considering the substantive issues, however, the Lemon Court
had to determine whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring suit. The
court gave summary treatment to the standing of the organizational
plaintiffs, concluding that these plaintiffs, although possessing good motives, had "no personal stake or adverse interests which would demonstrate
their standing as affected parties.'1 8 The court next looked to whether
or not Plaintiff Lemon fulfilled the required two nexuses established in
Flast.19 Because Lemon alleged payment of an entrance fee into a Pennsylvania race track, the court found he established his status as a taxpayer
whose money was being used by the legislature in funding its educational
enactment, thus fulfilling the nexus between his taxpayer status and the
type of legislation enacted. Lemon further alleged that the Act was in
violation of the establishment clause, which is a specific limitation on the
taxing and spending powers of the state legislature, thus establishing the
second nexus.
The court turned its attention to the remaining two individual plaintiffs to determine whether they had established a sufficient interest to
acquire standing on either establishment or free exercise grounds. Since
these plaintiffs had failed to allege payment of any monies to a race track,
the court concluded they lacked standing as affected taxpayers seeking
redress for violation of the establishment clause. However, the court
recognized as sufficient to establish their standing on free exercise grounds,
regardless of the requirements of Flast,20 the plaintiffs' contention that
18. -_ F. Supp. at _. For support of this holding, see Davis, Standing:
Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. Riv. 601 (1968); But see Jaffe, Standing to
Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. Rzv. 1265 (1961); Jaffe,
Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. Rim. 255 (1961).
19. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. The court reasoned that since
the first amendment applies to both Federal and State governmental powers, the
exercise of State taxing and spending powers is also limited, and as such the requirements of standing as enunciated in Flast should apply. Lemon v. Kurtzman, . F.
Supp. at
20. Judge Hastie, dissenting, disagreed with this holding, explaining that "the
plaintiffs should have an established monetary interest in the relief sought . . ." and
since "they do not contribute revenues disbursed under the Act . . ." he concluded they
"do not have standing to challenge ... under either of the religious clauses. . . .....F.
Supp. at .-...This conclusion, however, is subject to criticism in that, "[t]here has
never been any doubt about the clear right of a plaintiff to sue in a state or federal
court if he can demonstrate that his free exercise of religion . . .has been infringed."
Drinan, Standing to Sue In Establishment Cases, in RELIGION AND THI PUBLIC ORDER
172-73 (D. Giannella ed. 1965). Strictly speaking, the complaint does fail to allege how
the plaintiffs' free exercise of religion was infringed upon and perhaps, for this reason,
standing could have been denied. But the lack of proper phrasing in an allegation
appears to be little justification for declining to at least hear an argument based on such
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they had not paid a race track fee because to do so would require them
to pay a tax for the support of religion in violation of their rights of
conscience, which is protected by the free exercise clause.
After having resolved the standing issue,2 1 the court considered the
merits of the establishment and free exercise contentions of the plaintiffs.
Viewing Allen as the pertinent precedent, the court analyzed the Pennsylvania legislation to see whether it met the strictures of the purpose
and primary effect test. The court refused to make an independent finding
as to the purpose of Act, 22 and accepted as controlling the purpose
stated by the legislators which was the promotion of the secular education
of children attending nonpublic schools within the state. 23 The majority
conceded that one of the effects of the Act is to confer incidental benefits
to nonpublic schools, but because the Act restricts aid to strictly secular
subjects, 24 the court reasoned that neither the purpose nor the primary
effect of the statute advanced or inhibited religion.
The plaintiff's second main contention - that the Act violates the
free exercise clause by compulsory taxation for the support of religion was summarily dismissed by the court. Reasoning from its previous conclusion that the Act does not support religion, the court explained that
the plaintiffs would therefore not be supporting any religious institution
by attending a Pennsylvania race track. The plaintiffs also alleged that
the Act forces them against their religious conscience into contributing
to the support of sectarian schools. The court again dismissed the plainan essential freedom as the free exercise clause seeks to protect. Cf. Sherbert v.

Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
21. The court rejected the standing of all plaintiffs under the equal protection
clause noting the lack of any claim to the effect that the plaintiffs' children were
denied admission to any of the defendant schools because of race or religion. __ F.
Supp. at _

22. The plaintiffs' contended that "[t]he doctrine of separation of powers requires
the judiciary, following prescribed rules of statutory interpretation, to make its own
determination of legislative purpose." Brief for Plaintiff at 40, Lemon v. Kurtzman,
F. Supp. __ (E.D. Pa. 1969).
23. The court made specific note of the legislative policy underlying the Act.
In its legislative findings and declaration of policy the Pennsylvania Legislature has determined that a crisis exists in elementary and secondary education in
Pennsylvania due to rapid increases in costs and school population and consequent
demands for more teachers and facilities. It was also found that twenty per cent
of all elementary and secondary school children in Pennsylvania fulfill the requirements of the Commonwealth's compulsory school attendance laws in nonpublic schools. It has been further recognized that elementary and secondary
education constitutes a public welfare purpose and that nonpublic education, by
providing instruction in secular subjects, contributes significantly to the achievement of this public purpose. The Legislature, therefore, concluded that it is a
governmental duty to support the achievement of this public welfare purpose
by supporting the purely secular objectives of nonpublic education.
,
(E.D. Pa. 1969), citing PA. SAT.tit. 24,
F. Supp.
Lemon v. Kurtzman,
§ 5602 (Supp. 1969).
24. The court stated that "the statute is not only limited to secular subjects but
to a limited number of specific secular subjects peculiarly unconnected with and
unrelated to the teaching of religious doctrines."

__

F. Supp. at _.

The legisla-

ture, it seems, also took pains to dispel the inference that the act would aid religion
directly in defining secular subject to "mean any course which is presented in the
curricula of the public schools of the Commonwealth and shall not include any subject
matter expressing religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of any sect."
PA. STAT. tit. 24, § 5603(3) (Supp. 1969).
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tiffs' allegation with little discussion, noting the plaintiffs' failure to allege
what their "religious beliefs are nor how the . . . Act . . . coerces them in
the practice of their religion. ' 25 Consequently, the court concluded that defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under both the estabment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment must be granted.
In reaching its decision the Lemon court followed the Allen precedent
in rejecting the polar positions which have been posited by some authorities who have attempted to clarify the meaning of the first amendment
religious clauses. 26 One extreme position would deny all aid to nonpublic
schools on the theory that the establishment clause must be strictly construed as forbidding aid, either directly or indirectly, to religion. 27 In allowing the expenditure under the Act it is evident that the Lemon court does
not take this position. This rejection is a recognition of the hardship such
a stand would place on nonpublic schools; in fact, the no-aid position
would actually penalize an educational institution because it followed a
particular religious belief.
The other extreme contends that the first amendment requires aid to
nonpublic schools. The proponents of this position argue that in order to
be neutral, the state must give equally to public and nonpublic schools. 2 8
The use of the secular purpose and primary effect standard is a step in
this direction,29 but it is far from an adoption of this position. A com25. -_
F. Supp. at ---.
The Lemon court relied on the Allen decision in
reaching this conclusion. In Allen, the Supreme Court similarly dismissed the free
exercise claim by stating that the "appellants have not contended that the . . . law
in any way coerces them as individuals in the practice of their religion." Board of
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968).
26. In attempting to draw its own conclusions on the meaning of the religious
clauses, it should be noted that the Lemon court, as did the Allen Court, appears to
advocate a unitary standard under both clauses. Thus, the purpose and primary effect
rule is used to determine the permissibility of aid not only under the establishment
clause, but also under the free exercise clause. See Valente, Aid To Church Related
Education - New Directions Without Dogma, 55 VA. L. Ritv. 579, 585-87 (1969).
See generally L. PFM4R, supra note 7, at 135-39.
27. The clearest expression of this view can be found in L. PMFV41R, supra note 7,
at 535, wherein the author reviewed the Everson decision as well as McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (which held that the use of public school
facilities for religious teaching violated the first amendment) and Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952) (where the Court permitted a program in which public schools
released students early in order to receive religious instruction at religious centers).
While reviewing these decisions Mr. Pfeffer concludes that "under the Everson,
McCollum, and Zorach cases it is clear that the First Amendment bars the appropriation of government funds to sectarian schools." See also Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
28. See, e.g., P. KURLAND, RLIGION AND TmE LAW 112 (1962).
The freedom and separation clauses should be read as stating a single precept:
that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction
because these clauses, read together as they should be, prohibit classification in
terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden.
29. Even before Allen, at least one authority viewed the Supreme Court's use of
the secular purpose and primary effect test as a move in the direction of the so-called
strict neutrality theory. Professor Donald A. Giannella has stated: "[a] shift from
an absolute no-aid theory of nonestablishment to one of strict neutrality [was signaled
by the occurrence of] . . . [T]he Supreme Court's recent adoption of the secular
'purpose and effect' test [in Schempp]." Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablish-
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plete agreement with the strict neutrality rule would have the same
amount of financial support appropriated to nonpublic and public schools
alike - something neither the Act nor the court's language advocates.
It is suggested that adoption of this extreme position would create an
impermissible constitutional result because it calls for the funding of religious teaching which the first amendment sought to prohibit.8 0
Assuming, therefore, that some aid to nonpublic schools is permissible, the constitutional discussion must focus on the proper limits to that
aid. One theory widely regarded as expressing the limit of constitutional
aid to nonpublic schools is the child-benefit doctrine.8 ' Under this theory,
aid in support of education to nonpublic schools will be permissible if the
student is the direct recipient of the aid, rather than giving the support
directly to the schools. The schools are seen as only incidently benefitting
by the support to the students. This theory received its greatest impetus
from a narrow reading of the Allen decision. 2 However, it is doubtful
that Allen should be so confined. One commentator has suggested a
broader reading of Allen when he noted that "[t]he Court's extensive
attention to identifying the secular education function of such schools
suggests that the function aided, rather than the channel of such aid, is
8
the critical constitutional factor."
This approach represents the position the Lemon majority adopted
in rejecting the child-benefit approach,8 4 when it explained that: "[T]he
constitutional result should not and cannot wholly depend upon the identity
of the payee. The use to which the funds are put must be the primary
ment, and Doctrinal Development, Part II: The Nonestablishment Principle, 81
L. Rev. 513, 515 (1968). Professor Giannella further observed:

HARV.

[Hlowever, application of the secular "purpose and effect" test in the straightforward manner called for by the rule of strict neutrality would not properly
serve the purposes underlying the Establishment Clause.
Id.
30. See Jones, Church-State Relations: Our ConstitutionalHeritage, in RSLIGION
CONrZMPORARY SOCIMTY 199-200 (H. Stahmen ed. 1963), where the author
suggests the unthinkable implications of outright public subsidy of sectarian schools.
31. The child-benefit rule was adopted by the federal government in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 241(a)-(l), 821-88 (1968). See
generally Kelley & Lanoue, The Church-State Settlement In The Federal Aid To
Education Act, in RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORD4R (D. Giannella ed. 1965).
32. See Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. Riv. 1680, 1681
(1969), where the author states:
[T]he [Allen] opinion is a narrow one . . . in its stress on the formal aspects
of the arrangements, namely, that the books were loaned, with title remaining in
the state, and that the requests were made by and on behalf of the students, not
the school.
33. Valente, supra note 26, at 593. See also The Supreme Court, 1967 Term,
82 HARV. L. Rnv. 63, 176 (1968), where the commentator, after reviewing the Allen
decision, reasoned that:
[b]ecause of the illogic of differentiating aid to the child from aid to the institution, the Court may decide to abandon the distinction and rely instead only on the
more general requirement that the aided functions be purely secular.
34. The dissent, on the other hand, considered Everson and Allen as merely
standing for the proposition that a state may provide "public services directly to its
people" and thereby "incidentally aid religious institutions" but, "that these cases do
not suggest that the Constitution permits direct public financing of a religious enterprise." -_ F. Supp. at _.
Judge Hastie's use of the words "direct" and "incidental"
appearsUniversity
to be just
a different
way of
ofLaw
expressing
the child-benefit
concept.
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concern." 85 This position appears sound in that even supporters of the
child-benefit theory agree that the sectarian schools receive an indirect
benefit from the aid to the children. The court's realistic approach takes
the issue out of a semantical dispute and allows the court to focus on the
real question - whether or not the purpose and primary effect is to aid
the secular aspect of a school's teaching.
The use of this latter test, however, does not resolve two additional
problems that have been raised regarding aid to parochial schools. The
first involves what has been popularly termed the permeation theory by
opponents of aid to sectarian schools. Essentially, the theory is that a
parochial school's education is so "permeated" with its own sectarian
teachings and ideals that it cannot be separated from its secular educational
function.86 Consequently, the dissent reasoned that the state cannot
support the teaching of any subject in a sectarian school without supporting religion.87 In rejecting this thesis the majority was in agreement
with the Supreme Court in Allen,38 when it explained that nonpublic
schools have two goals - one religious and one secular - and that the
state may provide aid to further the secular function without violating
the establishment prohibition of the first amendment.8 9
Certainly the permeation doctrine permits persuasive argument to
those wishing to prohibit support for parochial schools. However, before
one accepts the argument, the adherents of this position should come
forth with more concrete evidence than mere verbal pronouncements on
permeation. Without this added evidence, 40 the court's rejection of the
position is valid. Nevertheless, the permeation theory can not be ignored
as a possible basis for denying aid to parochial schools if adequate facts
can be produced substantiating the position.
The second difficulty posed by those opposing aid to parochial
schools - that the granting of aid to these schools will lead to "the evils
35. __ F. Supp. at __ (emphasis added).
36. The dissent prefers the word "inculcate" to "permeate," but essentially agrees
with the permeation theory in stating:
Through a total educational program offered in a separate religious environment,
sectarian schools serve to inculcate and reinforce in children doctrine and moral
precepts derived from the tenants of the church.
F. Supp. at ____ (emphasis added).
37. Judge Hastie is not alone in this line of reasoning. See L. PPEI'rER, supra
note 7, at 511, where the author concludes: "Everything taught in the Catholic school
is to be taught with the ultimate goal of education in mind - everything must be
impregnated with God and religion." It appears that those accepting the permeation
principle, including Judge Hastie, would advocate a return to the Everson rationale.
See also 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
38. The Lemon court, in relying on the Allen decision, stated:
[W]e concur with the Supreme Court's statement in Allen, . . . that "we cannot
agree ... either that all teaching in a sectarian school is religious or that the
processes of secular and religious training are . . .intertwined"..
F. Supp. at ---.

39. The majority also noted that the Act is further strengthened against an
establishment clause attack by pointing out that the statute provides aid to all
nonpublic schools, whether they teach a religious doctrine or not.
F. Supp. at _
40. The Court, in Allen, also failed to accept the permeation doctrine on its face,
stressing that the plaintiffs had failed to come forward with any facts to disprove the
legislative acceptance of secular educational programs in church related schools as
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/7
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that attend a widespread and pervasive intermingling of politics and religion" 41 - also poses a formidable obstacle to those advocating greater
aid to sectarian schools. It is submitted, however, that the mere existence
of this problem should not result in the end to all forms of aid to parochial
schools. Realistically speaking, any amount of support to parochial schools
will necessarily involve them politically. The extent of political involvement could possibly lead to some parochial schools emphasizing their
secular objectives in an attempt to receive more aid and in the process
neglect their sectarian teachings. 42 Nevertheless, aid could still be given
if the legislators make an honest attempt to limit such aid to the clear
secular objectives of sectarian institutions,43 so that the purpose and
primary effect is to aid the public directly and not religion. In this way,
although political intermingling is not avoided entirely, the recognition of
it as one factor in determining purpose and primary effect allows the
legislators and courts to limit the adverse results of political intermingling.
Similarly, the consequences of religious and political intermingling should
not be underestimated and the awareness of these consequences 44 should
lead to the avoidance of unconditional grants 45 to parochial schools.
In the final analysis, the ultimate issue to be resolved is where the
line should be drawn between what is primarily secular and what is
primarily religious. In drawing that line one is immediately faced with
a lack of consensus 46 on any one approach 47 or theory 48 to resolve the
41. Lemon v. Kurtzman,

opinion).

-

F. Supp.

-,

-

(E.D. Pa. 1969)

(dissenting

42. This consequence was recently noted by Professor Dallin Oaks when he
expressed the fear "that the desire to qualify for government aid may lead some
parochial schools to de-emphasize or debase their religious mission by secularizing
some aspects of their teaching." AMtRICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, Section of Individual
Rights and Responsibilities 11, 12 (Monograph No. 2, August 1968).
43. It should be evident at this time that it is difficult to separate the permeation
theory from the political involvement problem. Consequently if one espouses to the
permeation doctrine he would not agree that aid could be limited to secular objectives.
However, the evils of political intermingling can result even if one does not accept
permeation. Thus, care should be taken to limit aid to secular subjects.
44. See note 42 supra, where the commentator notes some of these consequences.
45. Professor Paul Freund apparently misconstrued the Pennsylvania Act when
he concluded that it calls for unconditional grants to the nonpublic schools. He also
mistakenly described the Act as "appropriating a fixed annual amount to be derived
so far as possible from the public proceeds of horseracing ... [and that] [t]he funds
could presumably be used for . . . buildings . . . in the discretion of the schools."

Freund, supra note 32, at 1681-82. But see Brief for Defendant at 14, Lemon v.
Kurtzman, -- F. Supp. (E.D. Pa. 1969), where counsel correctly indicates that
the Act "provides for no 'fixed annual amount,' [and] the source of the funds consists
solely of proceeds from harness and horse racing" (emphasis added). Nor does the
Act provide for funds to construct or maintain buildings. PA. STAT. tit. 24, § 5604

(Supp. 1969).
46. Consider, for example, the observation made by Professor Oaks.

Everyone who has made an objective examination of the practices and precedents
before attempting to state an argument for or against the constitutionality of
indirect aid to parochial schools has experienced the inconvenience of apparently
contradictory authority.
D. OAKs, Tia WALL BTWnN CHURCH AND STATe 7 (1963).
47. See L. PFEFFtR, supra note 7, at 521-26, listing the various arguments for
and against state aid to nonpublic schools.
48. See Giannella, supra note 29, at 516-22, representing the various principles

which can be advanced as underlying the establishment clause.
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issue. Whatever line of reasoning one adopts, it cannot be seriously
doubted that nonpublic schools serve a public purpose. 49 It is submitted
that the extent to which this public service is distinct from its religious
ends can be better determined by the legislature, 50 which is better equipped
to recognize the extent of the benefit to the public through its committee
system, and other fact finding facilities. It is suggested, therefore, that
courts give greater weight to legislative findings not only in determining
the purpose of particular legislation but also in its determination of
primary effect.
Joseph T. Sebastianelli

CORPORATIONS

PUNITIVE DAMAGES NOT AVAILABLE IN ACTION
UNDER SECTION 17(a) OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 UNDERWRITERS INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT INVALID.

Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc. (2d Cir. 1969)
Law Research Service, Inc. (LRS) prepared and distributed an
offering circular signed by its underwriter, Blair & Co., Granbery Marache,
Inc. (Blair) in connection with a public offering under Regulation A of
the Securities and Exchange Commission.' The circular prominently mentioned an attractive "Sperry-Rand Contract" while failing to mention that
49. The majority in the instant decision took note of this service when it
concluded:
The increasing national concern for education in our society, coupled with the
public awareness that private schools are performing a significant public service
in educating great numbers of school-age children, necessarily makes the State
interested in private education.
-F. Supp. at _.
See also JONnS, supra note 30, at 193.
It is equally manifest that public school expenditures would have to be higher
than they are, if financial difficulties compelled an abandonment of the parochial
school system or a severe cutback in the number of students now being educated in
the parochial schools and their Protestant and Jewish equivalents.
50. But see Freund, supra note 32, at 1692, where, without denying that the legislature can better determine the needs of the public, Professor Freund concludes that:
Although great issues of constitutional law are never settled until they are settled
right, still as between open-ended, ongoing political warfare and such binding
quality as judicial decisions possess, I would choose the latter in the field of God
and Caesar and the public treasury.
1. Regulation A of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(22) (1964),
permits small public offerings without filing a registration statement and prospectus
provided an offering circular, reviewed by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
is distributed with the stock. SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-62 (1956). For a discussion of Regulation A, see Glavin & Purcell, Securities Offerings and Regulation A - Requirements and Risks, 13 Bus. LAW. 303 (1958).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/7
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Sperry Rand Corp. had terminated some of its services in a dispute over
2
the contract and that LRS had filed suit against Sperry Rand Corp.
Morton Globus and twelve other purchasers of the LRS stock filed
suit in the Southern District of New York charging LRS, its president
Ellias C. Hoppenfeld and Blair with having violated section 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933,8 section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934,4 and with having committed common law fraud 5 in the publication
of the misleading circular. 6 Blair brought cross-claims against LRS based
on an indemnity agreement in the underwriting contract. 7 Plaintiffs asked
for compensatory damages and punitive damages against all defendants.
The jury found for the defendants on the charge of common law fraud
but awarded compensatory damages against all defendants for violations
of the federal securities acts and punitive damages against Hoppenfeld
and Blair for violations of section 17(a). On all the indemnity crossclaims the jury found for Blair. LRS and its officers then moved successfully to set aside the verdicts on the cross-claims for indemnity, but Blair
and Hoppenfeld were unsuccessful in their motion to set aside the award
2. LRS had entered into a contract on June 5, 1963, with Sperry Rand Corp. to

provide LRS with vital computer services. On January 29, 1965, with four days
notice, Sperry Rand Corp. terminated the contract and refused to perform certain of
these vital services for failure by LRS to pay $82,000 in debts accumulated over the
previous year. On the same day LRS instituted a suit against Sperry Rand Corp.
based on breach of contract and fraud. Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418
F.2d 1276, 1280-82 (2d Cir. 1969).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(2) (1964), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any devise, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1964), reads in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
5. See generally W. PROSStR, TORTS 708-13 (3d ed. 1964).
6. The offering circular became effective March 15, 1965, and mentioned only
that LRS was indebted to Sperry Rand Corp. and hoped that payment of the indebtedness could be deferred. The stock was completely sold within a few days while the
dispute was not settled until April 21, 1965. Blair was also charged with violations
of § 12(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(1) (1964), and § 15(c) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78(o) (1964). Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276,
1281-82 (2d Cir. 1969).
7. Cross-claims were also brought by Blair against Hoppenfeld and a third-party
defendant, Paul Wiener, Secretary-Treasurer of LRS, based on the tortious conduct
of those officers. The court determined that this question raised the same issues and
necessitated the same reasoning as used in the LRS cross-claim on the indemnity
agreement. 418 F.2d 1276, 1279 (2d Cir. 1969).
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of punitive damages.8 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the decision as to the cross-claims for indemnification but reversed
as to the award of punitive damages under section 17(a), holding that
punitive damages are not desirable for the effective enforcement of the
1933 Act and therefore section 17(a) does not support such an award.
Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969).
Created to provide greater protection for the investing public, 9 the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, generally,
and section 17(a) of the former and 10(b) of the latter, more specifically,
prohibit the use of misleading information, whether through devise or
omission, in the issuance 10 or sale" of securities. The provisions in section 17(a), however, apply only to misrepresentations by an issuer or
seller, while the provisions of section 10(b), through its accompanying
Rule lOb-5 x2 apply to misrepresentations by both purchasers and sellers.
In addition, section 17(a) deals with schemes to defraud, material omissions of fact, and fraud or deceit, while section 10(b) is so broad as to
cover any "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."' 3 Therefore,
section 10(b) usually provides a broader base upon which to ground
an action.
Unlike some other sections of the federal securities acts of 1933 and
1934,14 neither section 17(a) nor section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 expressly
provide a private right of action for violations of their respective provisions.
The courts, nevertheless, have constantly implied the existence of civil
liability under these sections.' 5
8. Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
9. See generally 1 L. Loss, SWCURITIPS RtGULATION 129-31 (2d ed. 1961).
10. The Securities Act of 1933 was primarily concerned with protection in issuance. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 Gzo. WASH.
L. Rtv. 29, 36 (1959) :
Throughout, its patent concern was primarily with the flow of securities from
the issuer through underwriters to the public rather than with the subsequent
buying and selling of these securities by the public.

11. One of the major concerns of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was the
regulation of post-issuance trading. 1 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 130.
12. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969), extends the coverage of section
10(b) to fraud by purchasers.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1964).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1964) (false registration statement) ; 15 U.S.C. § 77(1)
(1964) (false prospectus or oral communication) ; 15 U.S.C. § 77(o) (1964) (persons
controlling those liable under §§ 77(k)-(1) ; 15 U.S.C. § 78(i) (1964) (manipulation
of securities prices) ; 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (1964) (unregistered beneficial ownership by
directors, officers and principal stockholders) ; 15 U.S.C. § 78(r) (1964) (misleading statements) ; 15 U.S.C. § 78(t) (1964) (persons controlling those liable under
§§ 78(i), (p), (r).
15. Implied liability under section 10(b) has been upheld in seven circuits: Boone
v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962) ; Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne,
307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962) ; Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962); Hooper v. Mountain States
Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961) ; Errion
v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369
(3rd Cir. 1956) ; Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). See
also Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?,
57 Nw. U.L. Rgv. 627, 687-90 (1963). As concerns implied liability under section
17(a), most often, courts have either stated that it was unnecessary to determine
whether an action was maintainable under § 17(a) when one was maintainable under
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The creation of an implied remedy under section 10(b) has raised
the question of whether such an action would be subject to the limitation
of section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act which prohibits a recovery greater than actual damages in an action under that Act 6 thereby
prohibiting punitive damages. Even though several courts have held that
section 28(a) only applies to expressed statutory actions and does not
prohibit punitive damages in an implied action under section 10(b), 17 the
Second Circuit had previously held that punitive damages may not be
awarded in a civil action under section 10(b).18 The instant case is
significant, therefore, in that it explores the possibility of awarding punitive damages where warranted' solely on the basis of the implied civil
2
action under section 17(a). 0
The conflicting conclusions reached by the appellate and district courts
result mainly from conflicting assessments of the "desirability" of punitive
damages under section 17(a). Where remedies are not expressly provided
section 10(b), Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp., 201 F. Supp. 466, 469 (D. Del. 1962),
or they have taken for granted that an action is maintainable under section 17(a)
since section 10(b) is also involved. See 6 L. Loss, SECURITIEs RxGULATION 3913-14
(Supp. 1969). In the Second Circuit, however, where section 17(a) may apply where
section 10(b) is explicitly restricted by § 28(a), an action under § 17(a) has been
expressly recognized. Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968), (dictum), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) ; Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
1951); Dack v. Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Pfeffer v. Cressaty,
223 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). But cf. 6 L. Loss, SCURn'IEs RitGULATION
3911-12 (Supp. 1969).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78(bb) (2) (1964), reads in part:
(a) The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to
any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no
person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this
chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a
total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of.
17. In de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., __
F. Supp. _
__
(D. Colo.
1969), the court in holding that a private action for damages resting on tort principles
is not limited by section 28(a), stated:
In light of the nature of a private action for damages under lOb-5, and in view
of the fact that Congress did not contemplate this implied remedy based on federal
common law, we conclude that it is reasonable to rule that punitive damages are
allowable in a case such as the instant one....
See note 28 infra. See also Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 445
(N.D. Cal. 1968) (dictum) ; 3 L. Loss, S&CURITI s RZCULATION 1474 (2d ed. 1961)
(section 28(a) simply precludes double recovery). Cf. Reynolds v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., __ F. Supp. __
(D. Utah 1969) ; Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128,
144-45 (D. Md. 1968).
18. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969) ; Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
19. This discussion assumes that in any instance under section 17(a) in which an
award of punitive damages is considered, the correct standard for determining conduct
meriting such an award is used. The court here used the state standard. Walker v.
Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961). There is controversy over whether such a standard should be a federal one. At least one commentator believes that to use state standards would have the disadvantage of fragmentizing
an area of federal securities regulation. Note, 82 HARV. L. Rv. 951, 956 (1969).
Another contends that use of state standards would bring the question of damage
awards for securities violations closer to the community attitudes of the localities
involved. 44 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 226, 234 (1969). See also Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74,
86 n.11, 87 (3d Cir. 1965).
20. But see Nagel v. Prescott & Co., 36 F.R.D. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (denying
motion to strike interrogatories on ground that punitive damages are available under
the by
1933
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by the statute in question, as they are not in an implied statutory action,
the court must find the remedy both permissible under the statute and
necessary to the overall regulatory scheme in terms of furthering the
legislative policy of the statute. 21 The appellate court's reversal of the
district court was not based on a finding that the remedy was impermissible
under federal statutes.2 2 Although the court recited numerous possible
grounds for finding punitive damages statutorily excluded,28 it decided
that it was unnecessary to answer these inquiries in that it found punitive
24
damages to be unnecessary in the overall regulatory scheme.
The question of necessity was posed by the lower court as an assessment of whether punitive damages were in "accord with the overall purpose" of the Act and would serve a "desirable function. ' 25 This decision
was based solely on an analysis of the ability of punitive damages to serve
as a deterrent. The important question of whether existing remedies could
also serve this function was not raised by that court.26 The appellate court,
however, expressly attempted to analyze whether or not punitive damages
' 27
are "necessary for the effective enforcement of the Act.
Both courts found that any implied civil action under section 17(a)
would presumably have as its purpose the deterrence of improper performance in the issuance of securities.28 The appellate court, however,
determined the overall deterrent effect of punitive damages under section
17(a) by weighing the need for the additional deterrent of punitive
damages 29 as against the already existing "arsenal of weapons" for deterrence and retribution."0 While the deterrent and retributive ability of
21. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
22. In the lower court, LRS and Blair had contended that section 28(a) of the
Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(bb) (a) (1964), precluded a recovery of greater
than actual damages. Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 196
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
23. See p. 493 infra.
24. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964), applies the theory of Sola
Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942), to implied remedies under
the securities Acts.
25. Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 194-95 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
26. The language of J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), would infer
that any implied remedy must be needed in order to effectuate the statutory purpose
and not that it merely be an alternative remedy. But cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
684 (1946), supporting the use of any available remedy in an implied action for
violation of rights protected by the fourth and fifth amendments.
27. Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1284 (2d Cir. 1969).
28. See Landis, supra note 10, at 35, where the author states:
We were particularly anxious through the imposition of adequate civil liabilities to assure the performance by corporate directors and officers of their fiduciary
obligations...
Cf. Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 182
(1933). But for a discussion of other reasons for implied civil liability under the
securities Acts, see Dykstra, Civil Liability under Rule 10b-5, 1967 UTAH L. Rev. 207.
29. RESTATEMtNT or TORTS § 908, comment a at 554 (1939) ; G. MCCORMICK,
DAMAGES § 78 (1935). See generally Comment, Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts, 70 HARV. L. RZv. 517 (1957) ; Comment, The Imposition of Punishment by
Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1158 (1966).
30. This arsenal consists of criminal sanctions under the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(x)
(1964); suspension or expulsion by the SEC; recovery of actual damages in implied
civil actions under section 17(a) ; class actions under FD. R. Civ. P. 23; the desire
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some of the weapons in the "arsenal" is questionable, 81 the court's calculus
does provide us with the additional deterrent. The positive effect of
punitive damages was then weighed against its potential harmful effects.
The harmful effects are twofold. First, courts have been unable to
control the size of punitive damage awards,8 2 a problem which is amplified
in a section 17(a) violation where there are a potentially large number
of plaintiffs and individual suits which could arise from a single violation. 88
This could result in both bankrupting "an otherwise honest underwriter or
issuer who egregiously erred in one instance which affected many [purchasers] ''3 4 and depleting the amount of funds available to injured plaintiffs so that recovery would be limited to a first come first serve basis.
Second, the court desired to avoid an unnecessary inconsistency between
the two securities acts. Section 17(a) only provides protection to purchasers of original issues who are damaged by fraud.3 5 Defrauded sellers
would have to obtain relief under section 10(b). 36 For this reason
courts have attempted to create a uniform remedy for defrauded parties
by keeping sections 10(b) and 17(a) consistent.37 To permit punitive
damages under section 17(a) when section 10(b) has been found not to
support such an award would create an inconsistency between the remedies
of the parties to retain a good name - the psychological deterrent. Globus v. Law
Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969).
31. See Comment, Remedies for Private Parties Under Rule 10b-5, 10 B.C. IND.
& Com. L. Rzv. 337 (1969). For example, the use of class actions has still to reach
full use as a part of the arsenal. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Joquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d
Cir. 1968) ; Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In this regard,
there exists the question of whether different measurements of damages resulting from
different post-issuance holding periods by plaintiffs would destroy the common issue of
the class action. See Comment, Measurement of Damages in Private Actions Under
Rule 10b-5, 1968 WASH. L.Q. 165.
32. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). But see
C. MCCORMiCK, DAMAGFS § 83 (1935).
33. The court in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir.
1967), concerned itself with the problem that there is "no principal whereby the first
punitive award exhausts all claims for punitive damages and would thus preclude
future judgments." See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. Rev.
1173, 1194-95 (1931).
34, Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969).
35. Section 17(a) is expressly limited to fraud in the "offer or sale" of securities.
See note 3 supra.
36. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), closed the

loophole which had left defrauded sellers without remedy, quoted in Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 98 F. Supp. 506, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 193 F.2d 461
(2d Cir. 1952).
37. Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). For a good discussion of this
issue, see 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1424 (2d ed. 1961) ; Comment, Punitive
Damages Under Section 17(a) of the SecuritiesAct: A Myopic View of Congressional
Intent, 15 WAYNE L. Rev. 792, 803-11 (1969). But see Green v. Wolf Corp., 406
F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969), where the presiding
appellate court judge in the instant case analyzed the need for consistent interpretation of the two acts:
It is true that punitive damages are permitted under the Securities Act of 1933,
but that Act does not contain language similar to § 28(a) of the 1934 Act.
Congress might well have intended to impose different liabilities under each of
the two Acts since at the time of its enactment the requirements of the 1934 Act
could have been avoided if corporations simply refused to register on the exchanges. The provisions of the 1933 Act were less easily evaded. Hence lighter
penalties under the 1934 Act would have been an inducement for corporations to
comply with its terms and not "go on strike."
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available to defrauded purchasers and those available to defrauded sellers.
In light of their marginal deterrent effect and their potential harmful
effects, the court concluded that punitive damages are not "desirable" for
the effective enforcement of the Securities Act.
A finding of the necessity for allowing punitive damages would imply
that the existing deterrents are not sufficient to fulfill the purpose of the
Act.38 Only if additional deterrents are needed would a discussion of
whether punitive damages are desirable under section 17(a) be relevant.
The court points out that the existing remedies "serve to perform the
functions of retribution and deterrence."8 9 Such a finding would in itself
have been sufficient to support a holding that punitive damages are not
available under section 17(a). 40 In that the court does infer that the
existing remedies are sufficient, the decision to discuss the desirability of
punitive damages indicates that the appellate court did not limit its decision
to the measurement of necessity for a particular remedy but instead applied
its own method for measuring desirability instead of that used by the
lower court.
The method for measuring desirability as applied in the instant decision is based on questionable foundations as to the harmful effects of
punitive damages. In regard to the fear of overkill in the instance of one
egregious error by an otherwise honest issuer or underwriter, the standard
for conduct permitting punitive damages as applied in the instant case is
"moral turpitude or dishonesty and a wanton indifference to one's obligations." 41 While there has been debate as to whether scienter is necessary to the maintenance of a fraud action under the securities acts 42 and
the trend is clearly away from enforcing a requirement equal to intent to
defraud,48 there has not been such debate over lessening the standard for
punitive damages. 4" Therefore, as long as punitive damages are available
only in those instances of fraud where the defendant evinces "moral turpi45
tude or dishonesty and a wanton indifference to his obligations," it will
never be a question of egregious error.
The only underwriters or issuers threatened with bankruptcy through
the recovery of punitive damages would be those who have displayed the
requisite wanton or reckless conduct so as to permit the recovery of
38. See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
where punitive damages were not permitted because available remedies were adequate.
39. 418 F.2d 1276, at 1285.
40. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 428, 433 (1964). See also Stevens v. Abbott,
Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 848 (E.D. Va. 1968) (applying the Borak rule on
basis of necessity).
41. Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 193 (1968) ; see also
Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961).
42. Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964);
3 L. Loss, SSCURITIzs R4GULATION 1431 (2d ed. 1961) ; Note, Scienter inPrivate
Damage Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 57 Gto. L.J. 1108 (1969).
43. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1968). See Note, supra note 42,
at 1109 n.19.
44. See note 19 supra, suggesting that a debate exists only as to whether the
standard should be state or federal.
45. 418 F.2d 1276, at 1283.
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punitive damages against them. The elimination of existing parties who
have displayed such disregard for the investing public and the deterrence
of such conduct by others in the future would be a positive result of the
awarding of punitive damages in keeping with the purposes of the securities acts.4 6 Therefore, this threat of bankruptcy raised by the court should
have been used to measure the effectiveness of punitive damages and not
as a negative effect of such an award.
The desire to avoid inconsistency between the remedies provided by
section 17(a) and those provided by section 10(b) is a valid point of
concern for the court. However, it should be noted that the Second Circuit
47
is the only one so far to prohibit punitive damages under section 10(b),
relying on section 28(a) of the 1934 Act. It would be inconsistent to
hold that section 17 (a) does not support punitive damages in those jurisdictions which hold that section 28(a) is not applicable to implied causes
of action thereby permitting punitive damages under section 10(b). 48 The
tenability of the court's assessment as to desirability may rest upon the
resolution of the conflicting interpretations of section 28(a) of the 1934
Act. 41 Without these harmful effects, and query as to whether both are
necessary to the instant decision, the court concedes that there is a
marginal deterrent effect gained by adding punitive damages to the existing remedies, and thus would apparently concede that punitive damages
are desirable. The court would then have to base its exclusion of punitive
damages on the lack of statutory permissibility or on the lack of necessity
for allowing such an award as it originally announced that it intended to
do, but on which it failed to follow through.
The inference given by the court's opinion is that punitive damages
are not statutorily impermissible. Five possible theories for exclusion of
punitive damages are discussed by the court: 1) the non-existence of a
civil action under section 17(a) ; 2) the impermissibility of punitive damages without express Congressional intent; 3) the impropriety of importing the aspects of common law fraud into the statutory action; 4) the
orginal intention of Congress to have section 17(a) serve as a basis for
only criminal or injunctive actions; and 5) the express restriction against
other than compensatory damages in those sections of the 1933 Act which
expressly provide for civil liability.50 The first of these is denied by the
court as a practical point in light of the great weight of authority on the
side of implying a civil action.5 1 The next two theories are discarded as
46. See Landis, supra note 10, at 30-35.
47. See note 18 supra. See also Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., ____ F.
Supp. --- (D. Utah 1969), where punitive damages were disallowed by the district
court in the Tenth Circuit under section 10(b) relying on section 28(a).
48. See note 17 supra.
49. If the court in de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., ____ F. Supp. -_ (D.
Colo. 1969), failed to evaluate the necessity of punitive damages, such reasoning could
be used in future decisions to prohibit punitive damages under section 10(b) regardless
of the resolution of the conflict over section 28(a). See Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor &
Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 848 (E.D. Va. 1968).
418 F.2dUniversity
1276, at Charles
1283-84.Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
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51. See note 15 supra.
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"conflicting generalities." Only in the final two points could there be a
basis for excluding punitive damages. However, it is recognized that the
action under section 17(a) is more difficult to prove than those under the
express liability provisions.5 2 For this reason a court would not have to
be bound by the restraints in these sections, and the court admits that
neither theory provides a firm basis for decision.
The future applicability of the instant decision as a prohibition against
punitive damages under section 17(a) would have been strengthened if
the decision had rested on the lack of necessity for punitive damages, since
punitive damages could be prohibited under both sections 17(a) and 10(b)
on that basis. 53 As the decision stands, however, its applicability would
seem to rest on the resolution of the conflict as to the permissibility of
punitive damages under section 10(b). A reversal of the Second Circuit's
opinion on section 10(b) would leave this decision open to direct attack.
However, if the Second Circuit is upheld on section 10(b) this decision
will probably stand as a possible interpretation of the criterion for measuring necessity in the overall regulatory scheme.
The second issue before the court was that of indemnification of
underwriters. The Securities Act of 1933 generally prohibits most forms
of indemnifications 54 - attempts to avoid, through contract, the burden of
liability by parties to the issuance of securities. For example, under section
14 of the 1933 Act 55 any issuer or underwriter is prohibited from contracting for indemnification with a purchaser of the securities.5 6 Rule 460 of
the Securities and Exchange Commission 57 has further stated that indemnification agreements between the issuer and a director or officer of the
issuer would be void as contrary to the purpose of the Act. 8 There is,
however, no expressed sanction against an indemnification agreement
between underwriters and the issuers - a practice of widespread use.5 9
In Globus, the underwriter, Blair, had such an indemnity contract
with LRS.60 Despite the fact that the agreement contained an escape
52. Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Compare this
decision with the requirements of proof under sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act
required
53.
54.
55.

in Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
See notes 21, 24, 26 and 40 supra.
See generally 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1829-36 (2d ed. 1961).
15 U.S.C. § 77(n) (1964):
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any
security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules
and regulations of the Commissioner shall be void.
56. See Note, Indemnification of Underwriters and Section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933, 72 YALE L.J. 406 (1962) ; 82 HARV. L. REv. 951, 958 (1969).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1969), provides that the SEC may refuse to accelerate
the effective date of a registration where there is indemnification of a director, officer,
or controlling person by the issuer.
58. Kroll, Some Reflections on Indemnification Provisions and S.E.C. Liability
Insurance in the Light of BARCHRIS and GLOBUS, 24 Bus. LAW. 681, 688 (1969).
59. 3 L. Loss, SECUrTIS REGULATION 1834 (2d ed. 1961).
60. The agreement between Blair and LRS reads in part:
(a) The Company will indemnify and hold you harmless . . . against any
losses, claims, damages or liabilities, joint or several, to which you . . . may
become subject under the Securities Act or otherwise, insofar as such losses,
claims, damages or liabilities . . . arise out of or are based upon any untrue
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/7
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clause for LRS in the case of Blair's "wilful misfeasance, bad faith or gross
negligence" or if Blair were liable "by reason of its reckless disregard of
its obligations and duties,""' the court refused to find that the actual
knowledge of the misstatements of Blair constituted the requisite conduct
to bar recovery under the agreement. Instead it chose to find the agreement invalid under the securities acts. It was emphasized at the outset
that the only consideration before the court was the indemnification of an
62
underwriter who "has committed a sin graver than ordinary negligence,"
thereby limiting the ban on indemnification agreements.
The first argument advanced against such an agreement is that it
would encourage the "flaunting of the policy of the common law and the
securities acts."' 63 At common law, one cannot insure himself against his
own reckless, wilful or criminal acts.6 4 To permit an underwriter to do so
would be inconsistent with such a policy. As stated earlier, neither an
issuer nor director of the issuer is permitted to indemnify himself in the
same manner as an underwriter. Since section 11 of the Securities Act
of 193365 makes underwriters, directors, issuers and signers jointly liable,
to permit only one of these parties to indemnify himself would be contrary
to the purpose of section 11.
The second argument of the court is that such an agreement would
cause underwriters to neglect their high standards of care imposed by
the acts. Since an underwriter could avoid liability by showing that he
was less liable for the misstatement than the issuer he would have the
tendency to be lax in his duty of independent investigation.66 This argustatement or alleged untrue statement of any material fact contained in the ...
Offering Circular . . . or arise out of or are based upon the omission to state

therein a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading .... Anything to the contrary in this Agreement notwithstanding, nothing herein shall protect or purport to protect you
against any liability to the Company or its security holders to which you would
otherwise be subject by reason of willful misfeasance, bad faith, or gross negligence in the performance of your duties by reason of your reckless disregard of
your obligations and duties under this Agreement.
418 F.2d 1276, at 1287 n.14.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1288.
63. Id.
64. E.g., Kansas City Operating Co. v. Durwood, 278 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1960);
Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ala. 226, 146 So. 387 (1933) ; Haser v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 78 N.D. 893, 53 N.W.2d 508 (1952); W. PROSS4R, TORTS 48
(3d ed. 1964). See also 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES RZGULATION 3980 (Supp. 1969).
65. 15 U.S.C. .§77(k) (f) (1964) :
All or any one or more of the persons specified in subsection (a) of this
section [signers, directors, persons consenting to be named as directors, experts,
and underwriters] shall be jointly and severally liable, and every person who
becomes liable to make any payment under this section may recover contribution
as in cases of contract from any person who, if sued separately, would have been
liable to make the same payment, unless the person who has become liable was,
and the other was, not, guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation.
66. The Act was intended to sponsor and promote careful adherence to the
statutory requirements. Kroll, supra note 58, at 687; Landis, supra note 10, at 35.
To lessen the liability of the underwriter would weaken the necessity to adhere to
these standards. See 3 L. Loss, SgCURITIls RZGULATION 1831 (2d ed. 1961). Cf. N.Y.
Central R.R. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 377-78 (1873), refusing to accept the argument that indemnity agreements encourage breach of duty.
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ment can also be tied into the first argument since any event that would
cause the lessening of diligence by underwriters would be contrary to the
legislative purpose of the Securities Act of 1933.67
Third, the court considers the parties upon whom the cost of indemnity
will fall - the stockholders of the issuer. Since many of these stockholders will be the purchasers injured by the misstatements, they will be
indemnifying the underwriter for injury incurred by them personally and
caused by the indemnified party. This situation is similar to the indemnification agreement between a party to an offering and a purchaser thereof
under section 14.68 It is an evil that the Act was designed to avoid.
Some of the arguments posed by the court are open to rebuttal. The
desire of the securities industry to attract and retain qualified underwriters
in light of the risks involved for them would explain the inconsistent treatment of underwriters in the area of indemnification.
Such an intent
would also be in keeping with the policy of the Securities Act. Also, the
argument that the ultimate burden will fall on the stockholder who is also
the injured party is weakened by both the requirement of shareholder
approval prior to the offering 70 and the threat of a derivative suit based
upon the misstatements. 71 The analogy to an agreement between the
underwriter and the innocent purchaser is weakened by tying the shareholder/purchaser to the issuer.
However, from these three arguments, the court concludes that such
an agreement, at least where the actions of the underwriter amount to
more than mere negligence, conflicts with the proper purpose of the Act the encouragement of diligence by exposing underwriters to liability for
damages. In doing so, the court has created the situation where the actions
and knowledge of the underwriter must be classified by degree. For now
the courts must define ordinary negligence to determine what exceeds
that standard. This is the very practice that courts have moved away from
in the area of tort law. 72 It must also be noted that the jury in the instant
case had trouble classifying the actions of Blair, finding the requisite
conduct for punitive damages but not that required to find the indemnification agreement inapplicable. Since the basic arguments brought forth by
the court would also apply to indemnification of underwriters in the situa67. Landis, supra note 10, at 35.
68. See 82 HARV. L. Rnv. 951, 958 (1969).
69. See 3 L. Loss, SZCURITInS RSGULATION 1835 (2d ed. 1961)
This special treatment of underwriters apparently has a historical explanation
in the fears expressed during the early days of the act that underwriters would be
unwilling to assume the full risks of § 11....
70. The authority to issue stock is vested primarily in the hands of the shareholders. It is the general rule, however, that this authority may be delegated to the
board of directors. Some statutes still require shareholder approval, usually in cases
of increases and decreases of capital stock. See 11 W. FLETcHER, CYCLOPEDIA Or TRH
LAW OV PRIVAT COPO.ATIONS § 5156 (1958).
71. For a discussion of the use of Rule lob-5 as a remedy in a derivative suit for
mismanagement, see Lowenfels, Rule 10b-5 and the Stockholder's Derivative Action,
18 VAND. L. Riv. 893 (1965); Susman, Use of Rule 10b-5 as a Remedy for Minority
Shareholders of Close Corporations, 22 Bus. LAW. 1193 (1967).
72. See generally W. PRossXa, TORTS 183-91 (3d ed. 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/7
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tion of ordinary negligence, and since the courts would be required to
determine the relative negligence of the underwriters under the principles
of the instant case, this decision would appear to be the first step in the
elimination of indemnification for underwriters.
John C. Snyder

DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

-

CIVIL PROCEDURE -

PARTIAL

ASSIGNMENT OF A PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS INEFFECTIVE TO PREVENT
REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT.

Gentle v. Lamb-Weston, Inc. (D. Me. 1969)
Nine Maine citizens originally instituted an action for breach of contract in Maine state court against Snow Flake Canning Co., a Maine
corporation. After it became known that Snow Flake had earlier merged
with, and was survived by Lamb-Weston, Inc., an Oregon corporation, a
second action naming Lamb-Weston as defendant was brought in state
court. While the same relief was sought, three additional plaintiffs were
added, one of whom was an Oregon citizen who had no previous connection with the matter, but who had taken a partial assignment of one
one-hundredth (1/100) of each of the other plaintiffs' claims.' It was
conceded that the partial assignment had been made for the sole purpose
of defeating an anticipated removal to federal court by destroying the
diversity of citizenship that would have existed between the plaintiffs and
defendant if no assignment had been made. 2 After the defendant had
removed the action to federal district court" the plaintiffs moved to remand
the case to a state court on the ground that there was no diversity of
1. As consideration for the assignments, the Oregon citizen, who was a law
school classmate of an attorney in the law firm representing plaintiffs, paid each of
the original plaintiffs one dollar. Gentle v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 161, 162

(D. Me. 1969).

2. Diversity jurisdiction is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964)
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions

where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive
of interests and costs, and is between(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof;

and
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens or
subjects thereof are additional parties.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides:
[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . .
districtUniversity
court ofCharles
the United
States of. Law
. . Digital
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citizenship by reason of the addition of the Oregon plaintiff. The district
court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand holding, the partial assignment for the admitted purpose of defeating federal diversity jurisdiction
did not destroy the essential diversity of citizenship or defeat federal jurisdiction. Gentle v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 161 (D. Me. 1969).
The grant of diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts has both a
constitutional and statutory basis. 4 It has been argued that the reason
for its inclusion in the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 17895 was
to counteract the fear that a nonresident might incur local prejudice in a
state court.6 In interpreting the legislative mandate, courts have read it
to require complete diversity of citizenship - all of the parties on one
side of the suit must be citizens of different states from all of the parties
on the other side.7 Concomitant with the grant of diversity jurisdiction,
Congress has provided defendants with a right to remove to federal court
8
a cause of action which might have originally been brought there.
Accordingly, since the ability to sue in federal court or to remove a state
court suit based on diversity jurisdiction is dependent upon the citizenship
of the parties, the parties have been manipulated, i.e., added and subtracted, in order to take advantage of the rules of diversity and thereby
manufacture 9 or destroy diversity through assignment or appointment.
In the instant case several Maine citizens sued an Oregon corporation
and thus would have met all the requisites of complete diversity but for
4. See U.S.

CONST.

art. III, § 2, cl. 1, which provides: "The judicial Power

shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States ....
"
Similar language appears in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964). For a complete text of section
1332, see note 2 supra.
5. [T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the
courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in
equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum of five
hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien
is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought,
and a citizen of another State.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78.
6. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809). See
generally Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 3, 22-24 (1948). Certain commentators suggest that no prejudice truly exists
today. See, e.g., Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States
and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 521 (1928) ; Friendly, The Historic Basis
of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. Rev. 483, 510 (1928); Warren, New Light
on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. Rtv. 49, 83 (1923).
However, the Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue of the Judicial Conference of the
United States recommended that diversity jurisdiction be retained, finding that local
prejudice was still a factor in state court litigation. H.R. REP. No. 1706, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 14-17 (1958) ; S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-20 (1958).
7. Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U.S. 407 (1881). The rule of complete diversity was first
posited by Chief Justice Marshall in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267
(1806). In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967), a
unanimous Court noted that complete diversity is not constitutionally required.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1964).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964), provides:
A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party,
by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined
to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.
The manufacture of diversity jurisdiction is the corollary to the precise issue
of destruction of diversity involved in Gentle. For an analysis of the judicial and
legislative history of this area, see Comment, Manufacturing Diversity Jurisdiction,
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/7
14 VILL. L. Rgv. 727 (1969).
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the fact that one one-hundredth of each Maine plaintiff's claim was assigned
to an Oregon citizen. Further, the court quickly found that the plaintiffs
had complied with both the state and federal law of assignments and
thus the validity of the assignment was not at issue.' 0 Both state "real
party in interest" statutes" and rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12 essentially require that, "[a]n action shall be prosecuted in
the name of the party who, by the substantive law, has the right sought
to be enforced."' 8 Today the great weight of authority holds that an
assignee of a cause of action is a real party in interest and possesses
"the right sought to be enforced ;"14 and, the same is true with respect to
a partial assignee.' 5 The court in Gentle was thus able to frame the precise issue to be, "whether this Court is powerless to protect its jurisdiction
and the constitutional and statutory right of a defendant of diverse citizenship to have a federal forum free from the potentiality of local bias."' 6
Early Supreme Court cases found two rationales upon which to sanction a total assignment as a means of preventing removal. Firstly, a
colorable assignment - one which appeared to be bona fide - was viewed
as maintaining the assignee's identity as a real party in interest. Thus,
in Provident Savings Life Assurance Soc'y v. Ford,17 the Supreme Court
10. In this area, the initial inquiry into federal jurisdiction involves an examination of the state substantive law of assignments. The validity of the assignment is
governed by local law which the federal court is required to follow under Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). If the assignment is invalid, diversity jurisdiction
cannot possibly attach. One of the issues in the present case was whether the assignment was void as violative of the Maine champerty statute. MS. REv. STAT'. ANN.
tit. 17, § 801 (1964), provides:

Whoever . . . gives . . . any valuable consideration . . . with intent thereby to
procure any account, note or other demand for the profit arising from its collection
by a civil action shall be punished ....
The court concluded that the assignment was not champertous. 302 F. Supp. at 163
n.4. But the court correctly adds that finding a valid assignment does not automatically
mean that federal diversity jurisdiction is present. The court cites to the language
of Mr. Justice Harlan in Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823, 829 (1969),
"[tihe existence of federal jurisdiction is a matter of federal, not state law." 302 F.
Supp. at 166. This reasoning is noteworthy for otherwise state law could be used to
exploit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The ease with which this assignment
device could manipulate federal jurisdiction through state law indicates that the
expansion and limitation of diversity jurisdiction should be a matter handled by the
federal courts and not state law.
11. See 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 1f 17.02, at 53 n.13 (2d ed. 1968), for
a list of state real party in interest (and related) statutes.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) provides: "Every action shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest."
13. 3A J. MOORE, supra note 11,
17.07, at 221. See generally Clark & Hutchins,
The Real Party in Interest, 34 YALr L.J. 259 (1925).
14. 3A J. MOORE, supra note 11,
17.09, at 272-73.
15. 3A J. MOORE, supra note 11, 1f 17.09, at 279-82. The argument that a party
having one one-hundredth of a claim is not a valid plaintiff because of the doctrine
de minimis non curat lex has been held invalid. Ridgeland Box Mfg. Co. v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 82 F. Supp. 274, 280 (E.D.S.C. 1949).
16. 302 F. Supp. at 163. While Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
made substantive law no longer a factor in an attorney's choice of forum, there remain
several reasons for favoring a state court rather than a federal court: lower litigation
costs, greater familiarity with judges, local prejudice against the opponent, and the
tendency of federal judges to participate more than state judges in the trial. See
Comment, The Choice Between State and Federal Court in Diversity Cases in Virginia, 51 VA. L. Rxv. 178 (1965).
Published
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held that the assignment of an entire claim to a plaintiff for the purpose
of preventing removal from the state to the federal courts left the federal
court with no basis to assume jurisdiction.' 8
[Ilt may perhaps, be a good defence to an action in a state court to
show that a colorable assignment has been made to deprive the United
States court of jurisdiction; but, as before said, it would be a defence
to the action, and not a ground of removing that cause into the
federal court. 19
The Court reasoned that the assignment was not fraudulent, but colorable.
As such, the assignee was a real party in interest whose interest was
determinative in respect to the diversity of the parties; and therefore there
could be no removal to the federal courts since diversity of citizenship
20
was now absent.
Secondly, the lack of a uniform federal statutory scheme covering
both the creation and the destruction of diversity left the Court with no
basis upon which to take jurisdiction when a colorable assignment was
made to destroy diversity. In Oakley v. Goodnow, 21 the Court approved
the use of the assignment device to evade federal jurisdiction, reasoning
that as dismissal or remand was required by federal statute where an
assignment was made to create diversity, congressional failure to proscribe assignments made to destroy federal jurisdiction meant that federal
courts had no authority to take jurisdiction of a case by removal from a
state court. 22 Thus, the lower federal courts had almost unanimously held
2 3
that a total assignment was effective to frustrate federal jurisdiction.
While the Supreme Court has not spoken on the effectiveness of a
partial assignment to defeat diversity jurisdiction, such a question has been
considered by the federal and state courts of South Carolina. Ridgeland
Box Mfg. Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co.2 4 was the first case involving an
assignment of one one-hundredth of a claim in order to defeat federal
jurisdiction. It was held that an action may not be removed to a federal
18. Accord, Carson v. Dunham, 121 U.S. 421 (1887); Leather Manufacturers'

Bank v.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
Leshem
Hair v.

Cooper, 120 U.S. 778 (1887) ; Oakley v. Goodnow, 118 U.S. 43 (1886).
114 U.S. at 641.
Id. at 640-41.
118 U.S. 43 (1886).
Id. at 45. See Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 472.
See Rosecrans v. William S. Lozier, Inc., 142 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1944)
v. Continental American Life Ins. Co., 219 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
Savannah Steel Drum Corp., 161 F. Supp. 654 (E.D.S.C. 1955) ; Krenzien

v. United Services Life Ins. Co., 121 F. Supp. 243 (D. Kan. 1954); Bernblum v.

Travelers' Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Mo. 1934). Contra, Phoenix Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. England, 22 F. Supp. 284 (W.D. Mo. 1938). Phoenix held that the
assignee of an insurance policy claim lacked any real interest so that the assignment
"must be ignored." Id. at 286. However a later case, without completely overruling
Phoenix, held that as the Missouri legislature amended its statute to allow a nonresident assignee of claims based on insurance policies to sue in Missouri and obtain
local service on nonresident insurance companies, "the result is inescapable that the

practice of avoiding the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts by the assignment method

was recognized and approved." Daldy v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 38 F. Supp. 454,
455 (E.D. Mo. 1941).

24. 82 F. Supp. 274 (E.D.S.C. 1949), noted in 49 COLUM. L. Rv. 1154 (1949). 42
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court when a partial assignee, as an additional plaintiff, is a citizen of the
same state as the defendant. That the only purpose of the assignment was
to defeat diversity was found inconsequential. 25 Later, in Lisenby v.
Patz,2 6 a visiting judge construed South Carolina law to prohibit the
assignment, either total or partial, of a personal injury claim prior to
judgment. While the effect of the assignment itself need not have been
discussed, the court did not forego the opportunity to criticize it. However,
Lisenby was later denounced in Hair v. Savannah Steel Drum Corp.27 for
having misconstrued the state law on the validity of assignments. As the
partial assignment was valid, Hair remanded the action to the state court.
To reinforce their position these cases have relied upon Mecom v.
Fitzsimmons Drilling Co. 28 for the proposition that the motive or purpose
prompting the assignment is of no consequence. In Mecom the Supreme
Court considered the situation of an administrator selected for the sole
purpose of defeating diversity jurisdiction and held that, "it is clear that
the motive or purpose that actuated any or all of these parties in procuring a lawful and valid appointment is immaterial upon the question of
identity or diversity of citizenship." 29 Relying on Provident and Mecom,
the plaintiffs in Gentle contended that "federal courts must unquestioningly
honor the most colorable attempts to deprive them of their jurisdiction,
at least until Congress provides otherwise. 8' 0 The Gentle court was not
persuaded, however, and found Provident and Mecom distinguishable
on separate grounds.
Provident, in the court's view, was immediately distinguishable from
the instant case since it involved a total assignment rather than a partial
assignment. But the court does not rest on this mere distinction. Incisively
analyzing and comparing the end result of a total assignment and a partial
assignment, it concludes that "a fractional assignment, where the assignor
remains a party for the purpose of profiting from local prejudice, is manifestly less defensible [than a total assignment].'31 The key to the court's
reasoning is thus the practical difference between total and partial assignments. Where there is a total assignment, the assignor does not appear
in the courts of his state, divesting himself completely of all interest in
the outcome of the suit including, most importantly, all interest in a money
judgment that might be awarded. On the other hand, where there is a
partial assignment the assignor retains a very definite interest in the suit
25. Ridgeland Box Mfg. Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 82 F. Supp. 274, 276
(E.D.S.C. 1949); accord, King v. McMillan, 252 F. Supp. 390 (D.S.C. 1966); Heape
v. Sullivan, 233 F. Supp. 127 (E.D.S.C. 1964) ; Doremus v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
242 S.C. 123, 130 S.E.2d 370 (1963).
26. 130 F. Supp. 670 (E.D.S.C. 1955), noted in 34 T9XAs L. Rgv. 476 (1956).
27. 161 F.Supp. 654 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
28. 284 U.S. 183 (1931), noted in 45 HARV. L. Rgv. 743 (1932), 30 MIcH. L.
Rv.1341 (1932), 41 YALE L.J. 639 (1932).
29. 284 U.S. at 189.
30. 302 F.Supp. at 164.
Id.
Published 31.
by Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
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and can literally "profit" from any local prejudice that might exist against
the nonresident defendant.
In distinguishing plaintiffs' contention based on Mecom - that plaintiffs' motive to defeat diversity is immaterial - the court noted that
Mecom involved the appointment of an administrator and not the assignment of a claim. This distinction had been recognized clearly by the
82
Supreme Court two months earlier in Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc.,
which held that a partial assignment could not be used to create federal
diversity jurisdiction.
Cases involving representatives vary in several respects from those
in which jurisdiction is based on assignments: (1) in the former situation, some representative must be appointed before suit can be
brought, while in the latter the assignor normally is himself capable of
suing in state court; (2) under state law, different kinds of guardians
and administrators may possess discrete sorts of powers; and (3) all
such representatives owe their appointment to the decree of a state
court, rather than solely to an action of the parties. 83
To buttress its reasoning in the instant case the court discerns a
movement in Supreme Court decisions toward greater protection of the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. As evidence of this movement it looks
to Ex parte Nebraska,8 4 wherein an injunction was sought against a nonresident railroad for charging rates above those set by the Nebraska
railroad commission, the State of Nebraska being joined as a plaintiff in
order to destroy federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the circuit court that since the State had no interest in the controversy, it was to be viewed as a nominal party plaintiff whose citizenship
is not determinative for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. This reliance
on Ex parte Nebraska is perhaps the weakest point in the court's decision.
It is doubtful whether such an old case can be considered to show such a
movement toward protection of diversity jurisdiction; and further the
Supreme Court's disposition of the matter was more clearly concerned
with the propriety of reviewing the circuit court's decision by using a
writ of mandamus rather than the merits of the joinder.
As further evidence of the movement toward greater protection of
the federal forum, the Gentle court cites Wecker v. National Enameling
Stamping Co.,85 a tort case which involved the joinder of a co-defendant
for the express purpose of destroying diversity. The Supreme Court
affirmed the circuit court's refusal to remand to the state court holding
the joinder ineffective to prevent removal because it was clearly a "sham"
joinder where it was not conceivable that the co-defendant could be held
32. 394 U.S. 823 (1969).
33. Id. at 828 n.9. For an extensive analysis of Caribbean Mills and its effect
on prior precedent, see Comment, Manufacturing Diversity Jurisdiction, 14 VILL. L.
Rzv. 727, 741-43 (1969).
34. 209 U.S. 436 (1908).
35. 204 U.S. 176 (1907).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/7
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liable. While Wecker might be distinguished on the basis that it concerned the joinder of defendants rather than the assignment of a claim,
the court's reliance of Wecker clearly shows that it views the destruction
of diversity through the use of a partial assignment as being in the nature
of a fraud upon the court.3 6 It is upon this characterization that the court's
holding perhaps truly best lies.
The result reached in the instant case is commendable as it cures a
problem the federal courts had not heretofore fully resolved. Provident
suggested that if the purpose of the assignment was to prevent removal,
it may be a defense against the assignee in the state courts. Oakley
reaffirmed this language by noting, "resort can only be had to the state
courts for protection against the consequences of such encroachment on
the rights of the defendant. '3 7 However, the state courts have not provided this protection.38 Thus Gentle rectifies this situation by actually
offering the defendant the protection which the other federal courts had
incorrectly presumed the state courts would do.
This result would also be accomplished by section 1307(b) of the
ALI's proposed federal legislation:
Whenever an object of a sale, assignment, or other transfer of
the whole or any part of any interest is a claim or any other property
has been to enable or to prevent the invoking of federal jurisdiction
under this chapter or chapter 158 of this title, jurisdiction of a civil
action shall be determined as if such sale, assignment, or other transfer
had not occurred.3 9
A cursory examination reveals that the ALI is clearly proposing a motive
test for assignments. Thus if the transaction had "an object" of creating
or defeating diversity - and the Gentle plaintiffs expressly stated this to
be the reason for their assignment - the assignment will not be considered
determinative for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. While this motive
test presents additional complications, 40 the Gentle court enunciates no test
36. In further support of the proposition that the federal courts must guard their
jurisdiction against such devices, see 3A J. MOORE, supra note 11, ff 17.05[2], at 156;
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN THE

STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 160 (1969); Field, Proposals on Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction, 17 S.C. L. REv. 669, 671 (1965); Note, The Assignment Device in
Diversity Cases: The Illusory Right of Removal, 35 U. CIN. L. REv. 33 (1966);
44 HARV. L. Rev. 97, 100 (1930) ; 34 TEXAS L. Rgv. 476, 477 (1956) ; 40 VA. L. REv.
803, 804 (1954).
37. Oakley v. Goodnow, 118 U.S. 43, 45 (1886).
38. See Hayday v. Hammermill Paper Co., 176 Minn. 315, 223 N.W. 614 (1929)
(lack of a state statute making an assignment for the purpose of defeating removal
a defense to an action in a state court, resulted in the assignee maintaining his real
party in interest status) ; Schepman v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 231 Mo.
App. 651, 104 S.W.2d 777 (1937) (no state statute making such assignment a defense) ;
Heape v. Sullivan, 246 S.C. 218, 143 S.E.2d 366 (1965) (partial assignment made to
extinguish diversity and preclude removal of action found to be no defense to the
cause in state court).
39. ALl, STUDY OF THE DIVISION O JURISDICTION BETWEEN THE STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 22 (1969).
40. For a discussion of the problems involved in the motive test, see Comment,
Manufacturing Diversity Jurisdiction, 14 VILL. L. REv. 727, 744-45 (1969).
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and merely discards altogether the notion that a partial assignment will
defeat diversity.
Apart from the actual holding in the case, Gentle never satisfactorily
answers the basis of the plaintiffs' question: May the federal judiciary
itself limit its jurisdiction, or is legislative action necessary? As there is
no existing counterpart to section 1359, 41 which prohibits the creation of
diversity, it can be argued there is no federal policy against the destruction
of federal jurisdiction. 42 In respect to this problem, the court advances
the sentiment of Professor James W. Moore: "The proposals [of the
ALI] in this respect are good ones. But we respectfully suggest that the
federal courts should not await legislative action to cure an erroneous
doctrine which had been evolved by the federal courts."4 8 This solution
can, however, be rebutted by the rationale of Oakley which asserts that the
congressional failure to halt destruction of diversity while prohibiting
manufacture of diversity left the courts no basis for jurisdiction. 44 However, while there may be no true congressional policy against the destruction of diversity, the instant court clearly makes it a federal judicial policy.
While Gentle broke from precedent, it does augment the well-considered proposals of the ALI which noted:
So long as federal diversity jurisdiction exists, however, the need for
its assertion may well be greatest when the plaintiff tries hardest to
defeat it. The plaintiff who chooses to sue a non-citizen defendant in
a state court may be motivated by the hope that the out-of-state
defendant will be at a substantial disadvantage in that court, and the
likelihood of such motivation increases with the lengths to which the
plaintiffs will go to prevent removal to a federal forum. 45
If the reason for the grant of diversity jurisdiction and the right of
removal is to eliminate prejudice, any other result would endanger the
nonresident defendant to prejudice. The plaintiff does have the initial
choice of forum. But, the assignment device has the practical effect of
leaving the choice of forum entirely up to the plaintiff as it thwarts the
defendant's right of removal. This result would foster the very abuses
which diversity jurisdiction was meant to prevent.
Thomas F. Traud, Jr.

41. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).
42. It has also been argued that there is a policy favoring devices restricting
federal jurisdiction as demonstrated by the increased amount of the claim necessary
for federal court jurisdiction. Comment, Manufactured Diversity Jurisdiction and
Section 1359, 69 COLUM. L. Rtv. 706, 723 (1969).
43. 3A J.MooRx, supra note 11, 17.05[2], at 156.
44. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
45. ALI, STUDY OF THz DIVISION OF JURISDIcTION BTWEUN THE STATZ AND
FEDZRAL COURTS 160 (1969).
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INSURANCE

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL USED TO BAR THE DEFENSE OF NONCOVERAGE BY THE
INSURER AND TO EXTEND COVERAGE TO RISKS NOT PROVIDED FOR
OR EXPRESSLY

EXCLUDED IN THE POLICY.

Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co. (N.J. 1969)
Plaintiff, the insured, brought an action against the defendant insurance company to recover for water damage to certain business merchandise
which was allegedly covered by a fire insurance policy1 issued by the
defendant. At trial the insured contended that certain representations
made by the defendant's agent as to the scope of the policy's coverage
estopped the insurer from now denying that coverage even though it was
expressly excluded by the terms of the policy. The trial court, however,
granted the defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal. 2 The Appellate
Division affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action on other grounds,4
finding that the insured had failed to establish all the essential elements
for an action of equitable estoppel to lie.' The New Jersey supreme court
reversed, 6 however, holding, inter alia7 that: (1) equitable estoppel is
1. Plaintiff also made a claim for recovery under a homeowner's policy on the
theory that certain language as to personal property coverage should be deemed,
under the circumstances, to include the business merchandise as well. The trial court
held to the contrary and the point was not pursued on appeal. 54 N.J. 287, 292, 255
A.2d 208, 212 n.2 (1969).
2. The trial court granted the defendants motion for involuntary dismissal at
the conclusion of the plaintiff's case on the ground that statements by the insurer's
agent at the inception of the contract could not, under the parol evidence rule, broaden
the coverage of the policy. 54 N.J. 287, 290, 255 A.2d 208, 210 (1969).
3. Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 99 N.J. Super. 90, 238 A.2d 688 (App. Div. 1968).
4. The Appellate Division took the position that equitable estoppel is available,
under appropriate circumstances, to bring within insurance coverage risks not provided
for or expressly excluded under the policy. 54 N.J. 287, 290, 255 A.2d 208, 210 (1969).
5. To have an equitable estoppel in New Jersey certain elements, enunciated in
Feldman v. Urban Commercial, Inc., 70 N.J. Super. 463, 474, 175 A.2d 683, 688
(Chancery Div. 1961), are required:
(1) there must be conduct . . . amounting to a representation or a concealment
of material facts; (2) these facts must be known to the party estopped at the
time of his said conduct . . . or knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to him;
(3) the truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit of the estoppel, at the time when such conduct was done, and at
the time when it was acted upon by him; (4) the conduct must be done with
the intention or at least with the expectation, that it will be acted upon by the
other party; (5) the conduct must be relied upon by the other party, and, thus
relying, he must be led to act upon it; (6) he must in fact act upon it in such
a manner to change his position for the worse....
6. The court reversed the trial court's granting of the motion for involuntary
dismissal, affirmed the Appellate Division's ruling on the availability of equitable
estoppel and remanded the case to the Law Division for retrial.
7. A second issue in the case dealt with an amended pleading filed by the plaintiff. The appellee claimed that it was accepted by the court in violation of New Jersey
state law, N.J. Rlv. STAT. § 17:36-5.20 (1954), which provides in part that:
[n]o suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable
in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy shall have
been complied with, and unless commenced within twelve months next after inception of the loss.
The supreme court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the amended pleadings were
in substance
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available to bar a defense in actions on insurance policies even where the
estopping conduct arose before or at the inception of the contract ;8 (2)
the parol evidence rule9 does not apply in such situations;1° and (3)
equitable estoppel is available under appropriate circumstances to extend
coverage to risks not provided for or expressly excluded in the insurance
policy.11 Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 N.J. 287, 255 A.2d 208 (1969).
Prior to the decision in the instant case, only three jurisdictions,
New Jersey,'12 Nebraska,'1 and Massachusetts,"4 would not permit equitable estoppel to be raised in actions at law if the conduct complained of
occurred prior to or concurrent with the formulation of the written contract. In contrast, the vast majority of American jurisdictions adhered to
the guidelines' 5 laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Union
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson,'6 which provided that "any words or
acts raising an equitable estoppel may be shown by parol testimony, and
it is immaterial whether they appeared before or after the making of
the formal contract."' 7
In aligning themselves with the majority of jurisdictions, however,
the New Jersey supreme court abandoned one extreme of the equitable
estoppel spectrum and took station at the other. Consequently, New Jersey
law now not only endorses the use of equitable estoppel to bar a defense
in actions on an insurance policy where the estopping conduct arose before
or at the inception of the contract, but also allows the use of equitable estoppel, under appropriate circumstances, to bring within insurance coverage
risks and perils not provided for or expressly excluded in the policy.' While
some courts'9 concur with the New Jersey high court on this latter point,
others 20 are skeptical as to the equity and wisdom of the court's declaration.
With respect to the time of the estopping conduct and the parol
evidence issues, the court felt that it was necessary to overrule nearly
applied, thereby bringing the pleadings within the legal time limit for filing. Harr

v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 N.J. 287, 299, 255 A.2d 208, 215 (1969).
8. Id. at 304, 255 A.2d at 218.

9. The parol evidence rule has commonly been phrased as follows:
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to
which they have both assented to as the complete and accurate interpretation of
the contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing.
3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573, at 357 (1960).
10. 54 N.J. at 304, 255 A.2d at 218.
11. Id. at 307, 255 A.2d at 219.
12. Dewees v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 35 N.J.L. 366 (Sup. Ct. 1872), set the
precedent, which was shortly thereafter reaffirmed in Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Martin,
40 N.J.L. 568 (E. & A. 1878), and subsequently followed in Kramer v. Western Assur.
Co., 9 N.J. Misc. 1261, 157 A. 171 (Sup. Ct. 1931), and Weatherby v. Scottish Union
& Nat'l Ins. Co., 9 N.J. Misc. 1256, 157 A. 169 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
13. Gillan v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 143 Neb. 647, 10 N.W.2d 693 (1943).
14. Harris v. North Am. Ins. Co., 190 Mass. 361, 77 N.E. 493 (1906).
15. W. VANCS, INSURANCA § 87, at 516 (3d ed. 1951).
16. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 222 (1871).
17. See W. VANCg, supra note 15 § 90 at 541.
18. Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 i.J. 247, 307, 255 A.2d 208, 219 (1969).
19. See note 29 infra.
20. See Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 1139, 1147 (1965), for a list of the courts taking
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/7
exception to the broad rule announced in the instant case.
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100 years of case law and align itself with the majority of jurisdictions
because of the current state of affairs in the insurance field. When the
old law was established in 1872,21 insurance was not the universally purchased commodity that it has developed into today. The contemporary
insurance policy is a complex adhesion contract which is written in so
awkward and intricate a fashion that it is beyond the comprehension of
the average purchaser.2 2 As a consequence of this complexity and unintelligibility, the purchaser relies almost exclusively on the representations
of the selling agent to determine the nature and extent of the coverage
his policy will provide.23 In light of these facts it became obvious that
utilization of the minority view resulted in severe prejudice to those
misled prior to the contract's formation, since they were compelled to seek
redress by way of the far more demanding remedy of reformation.2 4 The
New Jersey court was not the first, however, to note that neither equity
nor logic could be called upon to support a rule that made so prejudicial
a distinction on such an arbitrary basis. For example, in Employer's Liab.
Assur. Corp. v. Madric,25 Judge Story stated:
I am at a complete loss to understand why coverage can be extended
because of an estoppel founded upon insurer's assumption of the
defense of an action against insured [a post-contract action] and can
not be extended on an estoppel founded on such facts as we have at
bar [a pre-contract action], when the prejudice to the insured is
even greater than in the defense-in-action cases. I take the position
that any rule which2 6presumes to advance such an anomoly is clearly
without foundation.
While the Harr decision drastically modified the law in New Jersey,
it did not mark a change in the supreme court's disposition toward insurance policies in general. As indicated by a string of decisions over the
past ten years, 27 the court has for some time had the general objective of
providing greater protection for the ordinary insured who is untutored in
the complexities of insurance policies. The court continued this objective
in the case under discussion by removing an obvious inequity and binding
21. Dewees v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 35 N.J.L. 366 (Sup. Ct. 1872).
22. Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 N.J. 287, 303, 255 A.2d 208, 217 (1969).
23. Id. at 303, 255 A.2d at 217. See also Raulet v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co.,
157 Cal. 213, 229, 107 P. 292, 298 (1910).
24. Reformation is a form of remedy, afforded by courts of equity to the parties,
to written instruments which import a legal obligation, to reform or rectify such
instruments whenever they fail, through fraud or mutual mistake, to express the real
agreement or intention of the parties. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1446 (4th ed. 1951).
The burden of proof in gaining reformation of a written contract is far greater than
that required to establish an equitable estoppel. "The mistake must be established to
the satisfaction of the court or the relief will be refused." H. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY
§ 104(2), at 279 (2d ed. 1948).
25. 54 Del. 146, 174 A.2d 809 (1961).
26. Id. at 161, 174 A.2d at 816.
27. See Kievet v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475, 482, 170 A.2d 22,
26 (1960), in which the court stated that those who are insured "should not be subjected to technical incumbrances or to hidden pitfalls and their policies should be
construed liberally in their favor to the end that any fair interpretation will allow."
See also Bowler v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 53 N.J. 313, 250 A.2d 580 (1969) ; Allen v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 208 A.2d 638 (1965); Merchants Indem.
Published
by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
Corp. v. Eggleston, 37 N.J. 114, 179 A.2d 505 (1962).
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the insurer to all the selling agent's representations relied upon by the
insured. General principles of insurance" as well as the similar holdings of several other jurisdictions" bear witness to the propriety of this
legal position.
Having so concluded, it clearly followed that the parol evidence rule
could not apply to equitable estoppel situations where the conduct arose
prior to or at the time the contract was formed. Such a use of estoppel
does not contravene the parol evidence rule for it in no way affects the
terms of the written contract or in any way attempts to change them. In
essence, it merely permits proof of an action or representation by the
insurer whose denial of it now would virtually defraud the insured who
justifiably relied on it. The compatability of the user of equitable estoppel
and the parol evidence rule was early rationalized by Mr. Justice Miller
in Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson,"° where he stated that:
[T]his principle [equitable estoppel] does not admit oral testimony
to vary or contradict that which is in writing, but it goes upon the
idea that the writing offered in evidence was not the instrument of
the party whose name is signed to it; that it was procured under such
circumstances by the other side as estop that side from using it or
relying on its contents; not that it may be contradicted by oral testimony but that it can not be lawfully used against the party whose
name is signed to it.
While the Harr court's rulings with respect to the time the estopping
conduct arose and the admissibility of parol evidence appear to be consistent with settled principles of law, its holding with respect to the use
of equitable estoppel to expand the policy coverage is widely rejected
because it contravenes some time honored doctrines of contract law.81
The possible implications of this new standard are both far reaching and
of considerable import, and for these reasons most jurisdictions refuse
to permit the use of estoppel to broaden the coverage of an insurance
policy. The overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions adhere to
28. 16A J. APPLZMAN, INsuRANcs LAW & PRAcTICs § 9166, at 471 (1968), where
the author states that:
An insurer may by its authorized agents, make representations which will estop
it from denying the fact so represented. Generally, an insured may rely upon
information from the insurer's agent in procuring a policy, and the company would
be bound by the acts, conduct, and representations of its agents irrespective of
the inclusiveness of the policy terms.
See also 29A AM. JUR. Insurance § 1049 (1960), which states that:
In an action on a contract of insurance, the insurance company is generally considered estopped to deny liability on any matter arising out of fraud, misconduct,
or negligence of an agent of the company. If either party must suffer from an
insurance agent's mistake it must be the insurance company, his principle.
29. See, e.g., United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 305 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1962),
applying Idaho law; Ivey v. United Nat'l Indem. Co., 259 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1958),
applying California law; Columbia Fire Ins. Co. v. Boykin & Teyloe Inc., 185 F.2d
771 (4th Cir. 1950), applying Virginia law; Clauson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 195 F.
Supp. 72 (D.C. Mass. 1961), aff'd, 296 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1961), applying Delaware
law in Massachusetts; Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bechard, 80 S.D. 237, 122 N.W.2d
86 (1963), applying South Dakota law.
30. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 222, 236 (1871).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/7
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31. See p. 509 infra.
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the view that "a loss not within the coverage of a policy can not be brought
'8 2
within such coverage by invoking the principle of waiver or estoppel.
A number of courts feel that "the effect in such a case . . . would be
to create a new contract without a new consideration." 88 Other courts
so hold because they deem equitable estoppel to be solely a defensive
weapon to be used only to prevent injustice, and therefore can not be
used affirmatively to create a duty. 4 The most common reason urged is
that such a use of equitable estoppel results in the court creating a new
contract which actually contradicts the written contract of the parties.8 5
Although these objections to the expansive use of equitable estoppel
seem formidable, upon examination some fail to hold up and others are
seemingly outweighed by the equitable results that the new rule may
provide. The argument which asserts that the court is creating a new
contract without new consideration fails to completely recognize the effect
of the equitable estoppel doctrine, i.e., the insurance company is precluded
from denying coverage which the insured was led to believe was part of
the policy and for which he advanced his consideration. Thus, the consideration rendered was intended to be applied to the coverage represented
by the agent as part of the policy, and no new consideration is needed.
The argument that equitable estoppel can only be used as a defensive
weapon appears to be no more than custom left over from the days when
law and equity were separate; and since this segregation of justice has
been eliminated in New Jersey"6 there was no compelling reason for the
Harr court to be impressed by such an argument. Furthermore, a con8
87
sideration of both the general definition and the essential elements of
equitable estoppel clearly show that there is nothing inherent in the doctrine which relegates it to merely a defensive posture. Just as collateral
estoppel, which was originally a purely defensive doctrine of law, is now
32. 17 J. APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAW & PRAc'ricg § 9404, at 16 (1945). See also
Home Ins. Co. v. Campbell Motor Co., 227 Ala. 499, 502, 150 So. 486, 489 (1933);
Ruddock v. Detroit Life Ins. Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177 N.W. 242 (1920) ; 5 R. COOLZY,
BRIUzS ON INSURANcg 3953 (2d ed. 1927).

33. Home Ins. Co. v. Campbell Motor Co., 227 Ala. 499, 502, 150 So. 486,
489 (1933).
34. McLemore v. Charleston & Memphis R.R., 111 Tenn. 639, 69 S.W. 338

(1902) ; Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Dallas Steam Laundry & Dye Works,

85 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
35. Ruddock v. Detroit Life Ins. Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177 N.W. 242 (1920);

Carew, Shaw & Bernasconi v. General Cas. Co., 189 Wash. 329, 65 P.2d 689 (1937).
36. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § IV (1947), provides that:
The county courts, in civil cases including probate causes, within their jurisdiction, and subject to law, may grant legal and equitable relief so that all matters
in controversy between the parties may be completely determined.
37. The court in In re Beier's Estate, 205 Minn. 43, 48, 284 N.W. 833, 838 (1939),
defined equitable estoppel as the:
[E]ffect of voluntary conduct of one party whereby he is precluded, at law and
in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed,
either of property, of contract, or of remedy, as against another person, who has
in good faith relied on such conduct, and has been thereby led to change his
position for the worse, and who on his part acquires some corresponding right
either of property, of contract, or of remedy.
38. See note 2 supra.
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accorded equal standing as an offensive argument in some jurisdictions,39
40
so to should equitable estoppel be accorded the same recognition.
With respect to the argument that such a use of equitable estoppel
can not be sustained because it contravenes time honored doctrines of
contract law, it should be noted that the California supreme court in
Raulet v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co.41 stated that an insurance policy
was so unique a contract, with all its "traps for the unwary,"4 2 that it
could not be enforced as an ordinary contract with the same strict compliance to contract law. 43 The New Jersey court has long recognized the
same fact4 4 and therefore was not constrained to follow basic contract
law in enunciating this new rule.
The most tenable argument advanced in opposition to the broad rule
announced in Harr is that, while tending to alleviate the inequities under
the old rule, it will result in fraudulent claims and even greater inequities
to the insurance companies. Most jurisdictions which follow the broad
rule attempt to overcome this argument by placing a heavy burden of
proof on the plaintiff. 43 The Harr court, however, required only "that
the insured has met his burden by a preponderance of the evidence. ' 46
This could mean a verdict for the plaintiff if the jury believed the insured's
words only slightly more than the agent's testimony, a result easily arrived
47
at considering the innate bias of the jury against the insurance company.
While the requirement of this relatively light burden of proof is consistent
with the supreme court's objective of providing a more easily acquired
remedy, it contains an inherent shortcoming in that it renders the court
more susceptible to fraudulent claims.
There are also other points with respect to the equitable estoppel
issue which have been left unanswered by the court in the instant case,
and the manner in which they are answered will greatly determine the
effect of the court's ruling in Harr. For example, in determining justifi39. See Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807,
122 P.2d 892 (1942) ; Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 A. 260 (1934) ;
B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
40. The New Jersey court is not alone in condoning this affirmative use of estoppel
in extending the coverage of insurance policies. For example, in Employees' Liab.
Assur., Ltd. v. Madric, 54 Del. 146, 174 A.2d 809 (1961), reversed on other grounds,
54 Del. 593, 183 A.2d 182 (1962), the Delaware superior court ruled that estoppel is
available to bring within the policy coverage risks not covered by its terms or excluded therefrom when an agent misrepresents to insured that the risk is within policy
terms, and the insured relies thereon to his detriment.
41. 157 Cal. 213, 107 P. 292 (1910).
42. Id. at 230, 107 P. at 298.
43. Id.
44. See note 27 supra.

45. Massachusetts requires the proof by clear evidence, Clauson v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 195 F. Supp. 80 (D.C. Mass. 1961), aff'd, 296 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1961);
Delaware requires the proof to be clear and convincing, Employer's Liab. Assur. Co.
v. Madric, 54 Del. 146, 174 A.2d 809 (1961); and South Dakota requires that the
evidence be clear and convincing, Farmer's Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bechard, 80 S.D.
237, 122 N.W.2d 86 (1963).
46. 54 N.J. at 307, 255 A.2d at 219.
47. Appleman, Joinder of Policy Holder and Insurer as Parties Defendant, 22
Liability Insurer as a Real Party in Interest,

MARQ. L. Rev. 75, 81 (1938) ; Note, The
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/7
41 MINN. L. Riv. 784, 788 (1957).
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able reliance, the question of whether the court will ignore entirely the
written policy or view the insured's claim in light of the clarity and
definiteness of the policy on that point remains to be answered. Nor has
the court indicated whether the determination of justifiable reliance is to
be a subjective test as to each individual or an objective standard as to
what the ordinary man would be justified in inferring from the agent's
conduct. Other courts have virtually ignored the written contract when
its terms would deny coverage the insured had been led to believe, by agent
or company action, that he possessed 4 8 An additional ambiguity exists
in that the court has in no way clarified what it considers to be the
"appropriate circumstances ' 49 it requires to allow the extension of the
policy coverage. Those other jurisdictions abiding by the same rule have
permitted it in all circumstances where equity requires that the policy
be so construed. °
One further point that must be taken into account is the effect that
the instant decision will have on insurance companies doing business in
New Jersey. These companies will now be faced with unexpected and
unanticipated claims arising out of representations made by their agents
and unbeknown to them. Since these claims were not considered in arriving at the present premium schedules, the added burden on the companies
will almost certainly necessitate a rise in insurance rates. In essence the
insured in New Jersey will be paying for his new protection by way of
higher insurance costs, as the insurance companies distribute the costs to
those receiving the benefit of this greater protection.
It is submitted that the New Jersey supreme court's ruling in Harr
provides for as great a degree of protection for the unwary purchaser of
insurance in New Jersey as can be found anywhere in the nation. It is
conceded that this new position, allowing equitable estoppel to be used
under appropriate circumstances to extend coverage to risks not provided
for or expressly excluded in the insurance policy, has some possible shortcomings. Yet it must be concluded that making equitable estoppel available
to bar a defense in actions on insurance policies even where the estopping
conduct arose before or at the inception of the contract, has wrought
upon New Jersey law a worthwhile reform long overdue. Whether in
implementing this ruling the courts will create the inequities some have
prophetized remains to be seen, but for the present, at least, it has removed
others which have persisted for many years.
Dennis W. Alexander
48. See, e.g., Clauson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 195 F. Supp. 72 (D.C. Mass. 1961),

where the Massachusetts court refused to permit the company to rely on a policy

provision as to the amount of coverage after it had issued a certificate for a greater
amount; California in Ames v. Employer's Cas. Co., 16 Cal. App. 2d 255, 60 P.2d 347
(1936), ruled the insurer was estopped from enforcing a clause contrary to the policy
ordered by the insured; South Dakota in Craig v. Nat'l Farmers Union Auto. Ins. Co.,
76 S.D. 349, 78 N.W.2d 464 (1956), stated that an insured is not barred recovery
because he failed to read the policy, stating the exclusion of the very coverage the
agent represented as being included.
49. 54 N.J. at 307, 255 A.2d at 219.
See notes
22 & 45Charles
supra.
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